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Zusammenfassung
In modernen Gesellschaften sind Wahlen ein wichtiges Utensil. Sie sind ein funda-
mentaler Bestandteil der Demokratie. Dieser Mechanismus muss immer fair und
korrekt ablaufen. Bedrohungen dieses Wahlprozesses ko¨nnten diese Anforderun-
gen beeintra¨chtigen. Im konventionellen Wahlverfahren beispielsweise ko¨nnte ein
Betru¨ger die Wahlurne manipulieren. Beim Distanzwahl gibt es aufgrund der
unkontrollierbaren Umgebung mehr Bedrohungen. In dieser Arbeit schlagen wir
sichere Wahlverfahren mit wichtigen Eigenschaften vor.
Die Pru¨fbarkeit (Verifiability) des Wa¨hlers ist eine neuartige Eigenschaft, die
von aktuellen Wahlsystemen bereitgestellt wird. Sie ermo¨glicht es dem Wa¨hler
festzustellen, dass seine Stimme fehlerfrei in der Abrechnung beru¨cksichtigt wurde.
Diese Systeme erlauben bessere Sicherheitsgarantien als konventionelle Systeme,
da Wa¨hler die Mo¨glichkeit haben Verfa¨lschungen und Fehler bei der Ausza¨hlung
selbst festzustellen. Meist basieren sie auf Verfahren der Kryptographie, um
dieses Merkmal bereitzustellen.
Wir stellen ein neues Konzept der Wahlurne vor, das auf dem Farnel Ansatz
basiert. Dabei erhalten Wa¨hler beim Wahlvorgang einen oder mehrere zufa¨llig
gewa¨hlte Belege u¨ber ihre Wahl. Dies erlaubt eine andere Auffassung der Wa¨hler-
Verifiability, in der der Wa¨hler eine oder mehrere zufa¨llig gewa¨hlte Stimmen
verifizieren kann. Dieser Ansatz liefert einige interessante Eigenschaften: das
Wahlgeheimnis ist von Beginn an gewa¨hrleistet und muss nicht durch Mischen
bei der Auswertung erzeugt werden. Des weiteren schwa¨cht es Angriffe durch
Randomisierung ab, die anderen voter-verifiable schemes anhaften.
Aufbauend auf der neuen Wahlurne stellen wir drei neue voter-verifiable, pa-
pierbasierte Wahlsysteme vor. Eines davon kommt ohne Verwendung der Kryp-
tographie aus und ist daher leichter versta¨ndlich fu¨r den durchschnittlichenWa¨hler.
Die anderen beiden beno¨tigen lediglich ein einziges kryptographisches Primitiv
und liefern bessere Sicherheitsgarantien. Zusa¨tzlich zu diesen Systemen stellen
wir Erweiterungen des Threeballot Protokolls und des Randell-Ryan Schemas
vor. Beide sind voter-verifiable und machen keinen Gebrauch von Kryptogra-
phie. Allerdings ko¨nnen sie weniger Garantien leisten als kryptographie-basierte
Systeme.
Die gezeigten voter-verifiable schemes beru¨cksichtigen eine kontrollierte Umge-
bung wie etwa die bekannten, konventionellen Wahlen. Distanzwahl, beispiel-
sweise per Internet, hat viele Vorteile gegenu¨ber diesen, und ist daru¨ber hinaus
sehr anspruchsvoll. Obwohl die existierende Technologie solcheWahlen ermo¨glicht
ko¨nnte gibt es eine Menge verbundener Bedrohungen wie den Zwang bei der
v
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Stimmabgabe oder den Verkauf der Wahlstimme. Daher geben wir auch ein Sys-
tem zur Internet-Wahl an. Unser Vorschlag schwa¨cht Angriffe per Zwang und ist
im Vergleich zu bisherigen Systemen effizienter bei Wahlen in großem Rahmen.
vi
Abstract
Voting is an important tool for modern societies. It is fundamental for the democ-
racy. This mechanism must be fair and accurate. However, threats intrinsic in
the voting process may compromise these requisites. In conventional voting, dis-
honest talliers may corrupt the ballot box, for instance. Remote voting has more
threats due to the uncontrolled environment. In this work, we propose secure
protocols for polling station and remote voting with attractive properties.
Voter-verifiability is a novel security feature provided by recent voting systems.
It allows voters to confirm that their votes are accurately counted in the tally.
These systems provide better security guarantees than the conventional ones as
voters are able to detect corruptions of votes and counting errors. They usually
rely on cryptography to implement this feature.
We introduce a novel concept of ballot box based on the Farnel approach. It
provides voters, when they cast their votes, with one or more random selected
receipts. This allows a different notion of voter-verifiability in which the voter
may verify one or more random votes. The idea has a number of attractive
features: ballot secrecy is achieved up front and does not have to be provided by
anonymising mixes during tabulation. Also, it mitigates randomization attacks
that are inherent in some voter-verifiable schemes.
Based on the new ballot box, we introduce three new voter-verifiable paper-
based schemes. One of these schemes does not employ cryptography and thus
can be more easily understood by the average voter. The others require just a
single cryptographic primitive and achieve better security guarantees. In addition
to these schemes, we propose improvements to the Threeballot and Randell-
Ryan voting protocols. These schemes are voter-verifiable and do not employ
cryptography. However, they ensure less guarantees than cryptographic based
systems.
The voter-verifiable schemes given consider a controlled environment as con-
ventional voting. Remote Internet voting, however, has many benefits over the
conventional ones and is challenging. Although the existing technology render
possible such voting, it has a number of associated threats as coercion and vote
selling. We also propose a new scheme for remote Internet voting. The proposal
mitigates coercive attacks and is more efficient for large scale voting than the
previous solutions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Voting systems have been used since the ancient times and are fundamental for
the modern democratic societies. Early systems, though, did not provide security
guarantees as those existing today. Before printed ballots became a standard, for
instance, votes were issued using tickets provided by political parties or even
in voice [55] compromising the voter privacy. The necessity of secure systems,
however, became evident and motivated the design of new systems as soon as
frauds or their risks arose. Frauds were one of the reasons for the adoption
of the Australian secret ballot in 19th century [55, 46]. More recently, voting
machines had to be improved due to their vulnerabilities [62]. Besides security
factors, the advance of the technology has also contributed to the adoption of
new systems. Computers have replaced paper ballots in some countries as Brazil.
Remote voting via Internet has been used as alternative to conventional methods
in Estonia [33].
Traditional paper-based voting is simple and effective. Voters choose their
candidates in the privacy of a voting booth and cast their votes into a ballot
box. At the end of the voting period talliers open the ballot box and count
all votes. This voting system, though, requires trust in the tabulation process.
Because manipulations cannot be detected, adversaries (e.g. dishonest officials)
may alter, replace, or even spoil votes in order to compromise the final results. In
addition, this voting is susceptible to other threats such as chain voting [47, 57].
Differently from systems traditionally used, modern voting schemes such as
Preˆt-a`-Voter [83, 22] and PunchScan [77] require less trust in the systems’ compo-
nents or in the officials. These schemes afford high degree of security by providing
voters strong evidences that their votes were accurately tabulated. In particular,
voters obtain protected receipts corresponding to their votes and use them to
verify their votes are included in the final count (voter-verifiability). Although
associated to the voters’ votes, the receipts do not leak any information about
the candidates chosen. This way, even if voters are prepared to cooperate with
coercers or vote bribers, they cannot convince them about their votes.
In order to achieve security and to implement voter-verifiability, modern voting
schemes rely on cryptography. Such technology makes the security of these sys-
tems comparable or even better than traditional paper-based voting. However,
1
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whereas cryptography can be understood by experts, these mechanisms are not
easily grasped by voters who cannot comprehend systems’ details. Making voting
systems understandable, at least for the average voters, let voters trust on their
security properties and to accept them more easily.
With the goal of making schemes more simple while preserving the voter-
verifiability property, Randell-Ryan [78] and Rivest [80] introduced paper-based
schemes that do not rely on cryptography. These schemes can be more easily un-
derstood by the voters. However, they do not achieve the same levels of assurance
as cryptographic based systems. In the scheme proposed in [80], for example, the
ballot secrecy is not perfect and it may reveal statistical indications of voting
results before the voting ends.
In this thesis we first propose a voter-verifiable scheme that does not employ
cryptography. Our proposal does not expose partial voting results as in [80]. In
addition, it differs from the previous solutions by employing a new variant of
voter-verifiability. That is, a voter instead of receiving a receipt corresponding to
her own vote, she obtains one or more random receipts. In order to implement
this, we introduce a novel concept of ballot box. Instead of just receiving a ballot
as usual, the new ballot box provides the voters, when their cast their votes,
with copies of randomly selected, previous cast votes as receipts. This idea has a
number of attractive features. First, ballot secrecy is achieved up front and does
not have to be provided by anonymizing mixes during tabulation. Moreover,
any fears that voters might have that their votes are not truly concealed in
their encrypted receipts are mitigated. Lastly, it helps to prevent randomization
attacks.
Apart from being simple for the voters, our initial solution does not afford
assurances as those present in cryptographic based schemes. Indeed, the design
of voting systems without cryptography while achieving high degree of security
is hard as former solutions showed. This way, we introduce two novel voting
schemes that employ cryptography. In order to keep the schemes simple for
the voters, the proposals make minimal use of cryptography; they require just a
commitment scheme. One of the cryptographic schemes follows the same model
as our initial scheme. Though, it has better security properties. The other one
is a simplification of the first cryptographic scheme.
In addition to these new schemes, we explore ways to introduce the new concept
of ballot box into the Threeballot and Randell-Ryan schemes in order to improve
them. Our solution for the former aims at solving its information leakage prob-
lem where indications of the results can be obtained through the receipts. The
improvements for the latter scheme increase its security assurances.
The paper-based voter-verifiable voting schemes proposed in this work consider
a physical voting environment. That is, a place controlled by voting officials
where the voters go to cast their votes. However, the interest in conducting
remote voting over the Internet has increased recently. Countries as Estonia [33]
and Switzerland [39] have performed such voting. In these voting, instead of
2
being restricted to controlled places, voters are free to cast their votes over the
Internet using any connected computer and places of their convenience.
Remote Internet elections have many advantages over elections that require
physical environment. As voters have the possibility to vote using any computer
connected to the network and may perform this, for example, from the comfort of
their residences, it affords more convenience [36]; as consequence, such voting is
more attractive for voters and thus may increase voter participation. In addition,
voting results are computed faster and these voting are supposed to cost much
less than the polling station ones.
Despite its benefits, Internet voting is susceptible to coercion and vote-selling.
Because voters vote from uncontrolled places, coercers and vote buyers can easily
influence them to vote for their candidates. A coercer could, for example, observe
his victims while they are voting to ensure that they are following his instruc-
tions. Moreover, coercer and vote-buyers may automatize attacks to reach a large
number of voters. As stated by Jefferson et al. [52], ”the Internet can facilitate
large scale vote buying by allowing vote buyers to automate the process”. Al-
though these are realistic threats that would violate the voter’s privacy, they are
mostly ignored in practice. In the Internet voting conducted in Switzerland [39],
for example, these threats are not considered.
Former Internet voting schemes deal with coercion and vote-selling through
the idea of preventing voters from making or obtaining any information that doc-
uments their votes. This way, since voters cannot produce any evidence about
their votes and transfer them over Internet, they cannot be coerced to vote for a
certain candidate or sell their votes. Although this idea helps preventing voters
from revealing their votes as long as adversaries are not watching the voter while
voting, it is not sufficient to defeat other coercive attacks. Recently, Juels, Cata-
lano, and Jakobsson [60] introduced a more complete notion regarding coercive
attacks in Internet voting called coercion-resistance. In their notion, Juels et al.
consider that voters may obtain information about their votes and also that they
may be forced to abstain from voting, to reveal secret information used for voting,
or to cast random votes. The coercion-resistance notion is the strongest known
property that a voting scheme can fulfill to achieve security in remote Internet
voting scenarios.
Juels et al. also presented the first scheme that satisfies the coercion-resistance
property. The scheme provides better security assurances than previous propos-
als, but it has an intrinsic drawback: ”the overhead for the tallying authorities
is quadratic in number of voters” [60]. The proposal, thus, can only accomplish
small scale elections. Smith [91] and Weber et al. [95] presented schemes based
on Juels et al.’s ideas with linear overhead, but their schemes are insecure in the
sense of coercion-resistance.
With the goal of satisfying the coercion-resistant property while avoiding in-
efficiency, we also introduce in this thesis a new coercion-resistant scheme for
remote Internet voting. Our proposal follows the ideas of Juels et al. However,
3
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it has linear work factor and can be used in large scale elections.
Organization
This work is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we present the cryptographic
primitives necessary to accomplish our proposals. Most of these primitives are
employed in the new coercion-resistant voting scheme. After that, in Chapter 3,
we introduce the novel concept of ballot box. Next, we give the voter-verifiable
schemes in Chapter 4. These schemes are paper-based and employ the new ballot
box. The new coercion-resistant voting scheme is presented in Chapter 5. Finally,
we discuss future work in Chapter 6.
4
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Primitives
In this chapter we present the cryptographic primitives which are used in the
coercion-resistant voting scheme of Chapter 5. Its security relies on computa-
tional assumptions which we also recall in this chapter. Some of these primitives
are also necessary to the voter-verifiable schemes that we present in Chapter 4.
2.1 Bulletin Boards
Modern voting schemes rely on bulletin boards to publish their public information
(e.g. encrypted votes). This mechanism performs as a broadcast channel that can
be read by everyone and has memory to store data. However, only authorized
parties are able to write on it and all information written cannot be deleted or
modified anymore. The board also adds a timestamp to each data it receives.
This communication model for voting was first presented by Benaloh et al. [9, 26]
and helps achieving verifiability in modern voting schemes.
Bulletin boards are normally controlled by more than one party in a distributed
setting so that a certain number of corrupted parties cannot compromise the
board. This way, they can be implemented via a Byzantine agreement scheme,
such as the proposals of Cachin et al. [16] or Lindell et al. [66].
Voting schemes may use one or more bulletin boards for different purposes.
For example, a bulletin board publishes information used in the set up phase of a
voting, another stores votes during the voting, and a third publishes information
processed in the tally. Also, variants of the original communication model are
possible. The scheme introduced by Juels et al. [60], for example, does not require
authentication to write information on the board during the voting.
For the cryptographic primitives presented next as well as for the voting pro-
tocols introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, we consider that public communications
are performed through bulletin boards.
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2.2 Computational Assumptions
The voting scheme of Chapter 5 relies on two known and reasonable computa-
tional assumptions that we recall below.
The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption. We give verbatim the def-
inition by Katz-Lindell [61]. See also Dan Boneh [11].
Let G be a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1n, outputs a cyclic group
G, its order q, and a generator g ∈ G. The DDH problem is hard relative to
G if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists a negligible
function negl such that:
∣∣Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy, gz) = 1]− Pr[A(G, q, g, gx, gy, gxy) = 1]∣∣ ≤ negl(n)
where in each case the probabilities are taken over the experiment in which
G(1n) outputs (G, q, g), and then random x, y, z ∈ Zq are chosen.
The LRSW Assumption. This assumption was introduced by Lysyanskaya,
Rivest, Sahai, and Wolf [67] and holds for generic groups. It is described as:
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q where the decision Diffie-Hellman
assumption is hard, g, gx, gy ∈ Gq, and O be an oracle. The LRSW assumption
is as follows: by querying O with r ∈ Gq, it returns (a, ayr, ax+rxy) for a ∈R Gq.
After a number of t queries r1, r2, . . . , rt, it is hard to generate (a, a
yz, ax+zxy) for
z /∈ r1, r2, . . . , rt and a 6= 1.
2.3 The El Gamal Public Key Cryptosystem
The El Gamal scheme is a probabilistic public-key cryptosystem due to Taher El
Gamal [38]. This cryptosystem is secure under the discrete logarithm and Diffie-
Hellman problems. Though, it is possible to base its security on the decision
Diffie-Hellman assumption in order to achieve a semantically secure version of
this cryptosystem.
We present below a variant of the El Gamal algorithm, called M-El Gamal,
proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [60] that is secure under DDH as-
sumption. It uses a subgroup of order q of a cyclic group G.
Parameters and Key Generation
In order to define the group G, we slightly adapt the algorithm described in
Mao [68] and describe it as follows:
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1. Select a random prime q, k-bit long;
2. Compute: p = 2q+1 and verify p is prime; if p is not prime, select q again;
3. Select two random numbers j1, j2 ∈R Z∗p and compute the generators: g1 =
j21 mod p and g2 = j
2
2 mod p;
From the parameters (p, q, g1, g2), the public and private keys are computed as
follows:
1. Select x1, x2 ∈R Zq;
2. Compute: h = gx11 g
x2
2 mod p
The M-El Gamal public parameters are (h, g1, g2, q, p) and the corresponding
private key is (x1, x2).
Encryption
A message m ∈ Zq is encrypted as follows:
1. Select r ∈R Zq
2. Compute: gr1 mod p, g
r
2 mod p, and mh
r mod p
The M-El Gamal ciphertext is the tuple: (gr1, g
r
2,mh
r)
Reencryption
By means of the M-El Gamal cryptosystem, a new ciphertext can be computed
from an old one without being necessary decrypt the original ciphertext. Let
(gr1, g
r
2,mh
r) be a ciphertext, the reencryption is performed as follows:
1. Select s ∈R Zq
2. Compute: gr1g
s
1 mod p = g
r+s
1 , g
r
2g
s
2 mod p = g
r+s
2 , and h
rmhs mod p =
mhr+s
The new ciphertext is the tuple: (gr+s1 , g
r+s
2 ,mh
r+s)
Decryption
In order to obtain the message m from the ciphertext (gr1, g
r
2,mh
r), compute:
m = mhr/(gr1)
x1(gr2)
x2 mod p
where (x1, x2) is the private key.
For simplicity, the description of the next protocols of this chapter employs
a generic version of the El Gamal cryptosystems. In this version, for a group
defined as above, the public key is (h = gx, g, q, p), for a generator g and a secret
key (x). The El Gamal ciphertext is (gr,mhr), for m ∈ Zq and r ∈R Zq. The
plaintext is computed such that: m = mhr/(gr)x mod p. See Mao [68] or Katz
et al. [61] for details about this version of the El Gamal algorithm.
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2.3.1 Threshold El Gamal Cryptosystem
The El Gamal cryptosystem described above considers a single party to generate
the keys and decrypt ciphertexts. A threshold version of the El Gamal cryptosys-
tem, however, is necessary for the voting scheme presented in Chapter 5. In this
version, a number of parties n cooperatively generate the keys. The resulting
private key is shared among the parties and decryption is performed (without
reconstructing the original key) only if a minimal number of parties cooperate.
That is, for a number n of parties, at least t of them are required to decrypt a
ciphertext. The public key is unique, though.
A threshold cryptosystem is composed of a protocol for generating the keys and
another for cooperatively decrypting the ciphertext [29]. We present next known
solutions for these protocols concerning the El Gamal cryptosystem. The key
generation protocol is due to Pedersen [76]. The version described, however, is a
simplification of Pedersen’s scheme given by Gennaro et al. [40]. The decryption
protocol was proposed by Cramer et al. [29].
Gennaro et al. [40] showed that an adversary can influence the key generation
of Pedersen’s protocol. This scheme, though, remains secure in certain cases as
they presented in [41]. Gennaro et al. also proposed a more secure key generation
protocol in [40]. This protocol is less efficient than the Pedersen one, but it could
be used as an alternative in our proposal.
The protocols presented next employ the generic version of El Gamal, but they
can be used similarly in the M-El Gamal version described above. We consider
that messages are broadcast to all parties through a bulletin board.
Key Generation Protocol
Let O1, . . . , On be a number of parties (e.g. officials in a voting scheme), for each
official Oi the Pedersen scheme for cooperatively generating a secret key (x) is
described as follows:
1. Oi selects ri ∈R Zq as his value for the secret key x and computes a random
polynomial of degree t− 1 over Zq:
αi(u) = ai0 + ai1u+ . . .+ ai(t−1)ut−1, where αi(0) = ai0 = ri;
2. Oi computes Cik = g
aik mod p (for k = 0, . . . , t− 1) and publishes Cik;
3. Oi computes sij = αi(j) mod q (for j = 1, . . . , n) and sends it secretly to
the official Oj;
4. Oj (j 6= i) checks each share (sij) received from all other Oi (for i =
1, . . . , n). To perform this, Oj computes: g
sij =
∏t−1
k=0(Cik)
jk mod p. If the
equality is wrong, Oj publicly complains against Oi;
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5. If Oi receives complaints from more than t− 1 officials, he is excluded from
the next steps. Otherwise, Oi publishes his secrets (sij) corresponding to
each official that complained. These values are then used to verify the
equation from the last step; if the check fails, Oi does not perform the next
steps.
6. Let l be the number of officials that passed the last steps; Oi computes his
part of the secret (x) as xi =
∑l
j=1 sji mod q;
7. The public key is computed as: h =
∏l
j=1 hi mod p, where hi = Ci0 = g
ai0 ;
8. A public verification value vi = g
xi for each (secret) share (xi) is computed
as: vi =
∏l
j=1 g
sij mod p, for i = 1, . . . , l.
Note that the shares are generated in a similar way to Shamir secret sharing
scheme [90]. This scheme is based on the Lagrange interpolation of polynomials.
Decryption Protocol
We describe now the decryption scheme of Cramer et al. [29]. Let (a, b) =
(gr,mhr) be an El Gamal ciphertext, the scheme is as follows:
1. Oj computes wj = a
xj using his share xj and publishes wj;
2. Oj proves in zero-knowledge that logghj = logawj by using the discrete log
equality test (see Section 2.5.3);
3. Taking into account that the proofs of any subset δ of t officials are correct,
the plaintext is computed as: m = bQ
j∈δ w
λj,δ
j
for the appropriate Lagrange coefficients: λj,δ =
∏
l∈δ\{j}
l
l−j
2.4 Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme is a protocol which consists of two stages performed by
two parties, a sender and a receiver. In the first stage, the sender commits to
a value without revealing the value itself to the receiver. In a second stage, the
sender decommits the value such that the receiver learns the value committed
before.
These protocols have two fundamental properties, namely binding and hiding.
The binding property means that, after being committed to a value, the sender
cannot change it. The other property says that the receiver does not obtain any
information about the value committed before the sender reveals it.
A simple commitment scheme is accomplished through a secure cryptographic
hash function. These functions have the following usefull properties. They receive
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as input an arbitrary length value (m ∈ {0, 1}∗) and output a value a of fixed
length n (a ∈ {0, 1}n). They are also hard to invert, which means that it is
difficult to find a message m from the output value a. In addition, it is hard to
find two inputs which have the same output, that is, they are collisions resistant.
We describe below a commitment scheme using a hash function.
1. The Sender:
a) Selects a random number r from a large key space;
b) Let H be a secure hash function (e.g. SHA-512 [72]) and a message m,
the sender computes H(m, r) as the commitment of the message m;
c) Forwards H(m, r) to the receiver;
2. a) The sender decommits H(m, r) by revealing m and r later on;
b) The receiver computes H(m, r) and compares it with the commitment
received before.
An introduction to commitment schemes can be found in Damg˚ard [31] or
Goldreich [42, 43]. A scheme based on discrete log can be found in Pedersen [75].
For more details about hash functions, see Menezes et al. [69].
2.5 Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocols
Zero-knowledge protocols [44, 45] are interactive proof systems between two par-
ties: a prover and a verifier. In these protocols, the prover asserts that he knows
a secret and convinces the verifier about it. The verifier, however, does not learn
anything about the secret except that the assertion is true.
These protocols consist typically of three rounds and their concept is as follows:
the prover and the verifier have a common input, whereas the prover has a private
input (i.e. the secret about he wants to convince the verifier). The prover first
commits to some information and sends it to the verifier; after this, the verifier
returns him a challenge; finally, the prover sends back a response and the verifier
checks whether the claim is true or false. As these proofs are probabilistic and
the prover might guess the challenge, the protocol is usually ran a number of
times (for new values of commit, challenge, and response) to convince the verifier
with high probability. Section 2.5.1 clarifies these protocols by presenting an
application of this idea.
The concept of zero-knowledge above requires the prover to interact with the
verifier. That is, the prover and the verifier exchange messages in a three round
protocol. Interactive zero-knowledge protocols, however, can be converted into
non-interactive applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [35]. This way, the verifier
does not need to interact with the prover to verify the assertion. To accomplish
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this, the prover basically uses a secure hash function to produce the challenge
from his first message.
A formal definition of zero-knowledge protocols is given by Goldwasser, Mi-
cali, and Rackoff [44, 45]. See Damg˚ard [31] or Goldreich [42, 43] for a detailed
introduction to these protocols.
In the following sections we present the zero-knowledge protocols used in the
voting protocol presented in Chapter 5. The descriptions are based on non-
interactive versions as the voting scheme requires them to be.
2.5.1 Schnorr Signatures
The El Gamal cryptosystem is originally not plaintext-aware. That is, by means
of the reencryption property, a new ciphertext may be generated from an old one
without knowledge of the corresponding plaintext. This, though, is undesirable
in certain steps of our proposal. In order to prevent the use of this property,
we employ Schnorr signatures [87] so that the party who creates the ciphertext
proves the knowledge of the random exponent and consequently of the plaintext.
Let (gr,mhr) be an El Gamal ciphertext of a message m, the common input is
gr as well as the El Gamal public parameters, and the prover’s private input is
r. The protocol is described as follows:
1. (Commit) The prover selects t ∈R Zq and computes I = gt mod p. He then
sends I to the verifier;
2. (Challenge) The verifier selects c ∈R Zq and sends c to the prover;
3. (Response) The prover computes J = t + rc mod q and sends J to the
verifier;
The verifier accepts the proof if gJ
?
= I(gr)c mod p, that is, gt+rc
?
= gt+rc.
In the non-interactive version, the prover uses a secure hash function to com-
pute the challenge. The scheme now works as follows:
1. The prover:
a) Selects t ∈R Zq;
b) Computes I = gt mod p;
c) Computes the challenge as c = H(I, gr) mod q;
d) Computes J = t+ rc mod q;
e) Sends (I, J, c) to the verifier.
2. The verifier checks: gJ
?
= I(gr)c mod p
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2.5.2 Proving Knowledge of a Representation
In Schnorr’s scheme described above, the prover proves the knowledge of one
discrete log. Okamoto [73], though, introduced a protocol where a composition
of two discrete logs can be proved. That is, proving the representation of an
element with regard to a set group generators1. By means of Okamoto’s protocol,
the representation of (ashr), for s, r ∈R Zq and two public group generators (a, h),
is proved as follows:
1. The prover:
a) Selects t1, t2 ∈R Zq;
b) Computes I = at1ht2 mod p
c) Computes the challenge as c = H(I, ashr) mod q;
d) Computes J1 = t1 + cs mod q and J2 = t2 + cr mod q;
e) Sends (I, J1, J2, c) to the verifier.
2. The verifier checks: aJ1hJ2
?
= I(ashr)c mod p.
2.5.3 Discrete Log Equality Test
In the discrete log equality test, the prover knows a secret r and convinces the
verifier that two values gr and ar (where g, a are public group generators) were
both generated with the same r. That is, he proves that loggg
r = logaa
r holds
for the bases g and a. This primitive is owing to Chaum and Pedersen [20]. The
proof is performed as follows:
1. The prover:
a) Selects t ∈R Zq;
b) Computes I1 = g
t mod p and I2 = a
t mod p
c) Computes the challenge as c = H(I1, I2, a
r, gr) mod q;
d) Computes J = t+ cr mod q;
e) Sends (I1, I2, J, c) to the verifier.
2. The verifier checks: gJ
?
= I1(g
r)c mod p and aJ
?
= I2(a
r)c mod p
1Finding a representation of an element is known as representation problem (see Brands [13]
for details).
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2.5.4 Applying Okamoto’s and Chaum-Pedersen’s Solutions
The voting scheme presented in Chapter 5 requires a protocol for proving that
a value os and an El Gamal encrypted value as have the same exponent. This
proof can be accomplished using a variant of Okamoto’s and Chaum-Pedersen’s
protocols, such as the solution presented by Redz [79]. The scheme of Redz
was originally proposed to accomplish proofs for the plaintext equivalence test
protocol (see Section 2.5.5) and uses Pedersen commitments [75]. But it also
performs the proof that our scheme requires as described below.
Let (gr, ashr) be an El Gamal ciphertext of the plaintext as and a value os,
where r, s ∈R Zq and g, o, a are public generators. The protocol to prove that os
and the encrypted as have the same exponent is as follows:
1. The prover:
a) Selects v, t ∈R Zq and computes: I1 = ov mod p and I2 = avht mod p;
b) Computes the challenge as c = H(I1, I2, a
shr, os) mod q;
c) Computes: J1 = v + cs mod q and J2 = t+ cr mod q;
d) Sends (I1, I2, J1, J2, c) to the verifier.
2. The verifier checks: oJ1
?
= I1(o
s)c mod p and aJ1hJ2
?
= I2(a
shr)c mod p
2.5.5 Plaintext Equivalence Test
The plaintext equivalence test is a primitive in which the plaintexts of two El
Gamal ciphertexts (made with the same key and different random factors) can
be verified regarding their equality. This is performed without decrypting the
ciphertexts themselves or revealing any information about the plaintexts apart
from if they are equal or not. We describe below a distributed version of this
protocol due to Jakobsson and Juels [49].
Denote (α, β) = (a/c, b/d) be a new ciphertext created from two ciphertexts
(a, b) = (gr,m1h
r) and (c, d) = (gt,m2h
t), for r, t ∈R Zq and two messagesm1,m2.
In order to check whether (m1 = m2) or not, a set of parties first cooperatively
blind the ciphertext (α, β). That is, each party raises (α, β) to a random secret
value r such that (α′, β′) = (αr, βr). The parties then decrypt the resulting
ciphertext and obtain 1 if (m1 = m2) or a random value if (m1 6= m2).
For a number of parties O1, . . . , On and a bulletin board communication model,
each party performs the protocol as follows:
1. Oi selects ri, ti ∈ Zq, computes the Pedersen commitment [75] Ci = gri1 hti1 ,
and publishes it. For a public group generator g1 and h1 = g
x1
1 , where no
one has knowledge of the key x1;
2. Oi computes αi = α
ri and βi = β
ri and publishes (αi, βi);
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3. Oi computes a zero-knowledge proof that knows the values ri, ti related to
Ci, αi, and βi and publish it.
4. All parties computes (α, β) = (
∏n
i=1 αi,
∏n
i=1 βi) and cooperatively decrypt
(α, β) by using the decryption protocol presented in Section 2.3.1.
The zero-knowledge proof required by the scheme in step 3 can be found in
Redz [79].
2.5.6 Proof of Validity of an Encrypted Vote
The voting scheme presented in Chapter 5 also requires a proof that a ciphertext
encrypts a valid vote. That is, the prover convinces the verifier that the ciphertext
contains a vote for one of the options available without revealing the option itself.
The protocol presented below was proposed by Lee et al. [64] (see also [63]).
The prover proves that the encrypted option is 1 out k possible options. This
protocol is a variant of Cramer et al.’s [29] solution. The idea behind the scheme
is to prove the relation logg(x) = logh(y/m1) ∨ . . . ∨ logg(x) = logh(y/mk) by
means of a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge [34, 28].
Let (x, y) = (gr,mih
r) be an El Gamal ciphertext, where mi ∈ {m1, . . . ,mk}
for k options available, the protocol is described as follows:
1. The prover:
a) Selects w ∈R Zq and computes: ai = gw mod p and bi = hw mod p;
b) Selects dj, rj ∈R Zq and computes: aj = grjxdj mod p and bj =
hrj(y/mj)
dj mod p, for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , k;
c) Computes the challenge as c = H(a1, b1, . . . , ak, bk) mod q;
d) Computes: di = c−
∑
j 6=i dj mod q and ri = w − rdi mod q
e) Sends (a1, b1, d1, r1, . . . , ak, bk, dk, rk) to the verifier.
2. The verifier checks:
d1 + . . .+ dk
?
= H(gr1xd1 , hr1(y/m1)
d1 , . . . , grkxdk , hrk(y/mk)
dk)
2.6 Universally Verifiable Mixnets
A mixnet is a cryptographic mechanism first introduced by Chaum [18] that
provides anonymity. It is usually composed of more than one mix server (say
mixer) that sequentially shuﬄe a set of messages, encrypted in advance. That
is, each mixer receives the set, shuﬄes it, and forwards the shuﬄed set to the
next server. In order to perform the shuﬄe, the mixers individually apply a
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random permutation to the ciphertexts. In addition, they normally operate by
decrypting or reencrypting them, depending on the mixnet method employed.
The communication among the mixers can be accomplished through bulletin
boards.
Decryption mixnets follow the original concept presented by Chaum. Every
mixer has an asymmetric encryption key pair (e.g. RSA [81]). Each message is
encrypted with the mixers’ public keys. The resulting ciphertext is composed
of encryption layers so that they can be removed sequentially as they cross the
mixers. Mixers permute secretly the ciphertexts and remove the layers assigned
to them by using their secret keys. A different concept is used in reencryption
mixnets first proposed by Park et al. [74]. These mixnets employ just one key for
encrypting the messages and require a cryptosystem with reencryption property
like El Gamal (see Section 2.3). Each mixer reencrypts each ciphertext using a
secret random factor and randomly permutes the ciphertexts.
Universal verifiability is an additional property present in mixnet schemes such
as [71, 50]. As malicious mixers may compromise the shuﬄe, for instance by
replacing messages, in these proposals the mixers publicly prove that they have
performed the shuﬄe correctly. That is, each mixer proves that the messages
output were permuted and that decryption or the reencryption were performed
regarding the input messages. These proofs are normally accomplished using
zero-knowledge proofs. Jakobsson et al. [50] employ a different approach in which
mixers reveal part of the relation among input and output messages.
The scheme presented in Chapter 5 requires a universally verifiable mixnet to
preserve voter privacy. We refer to [71, 50] for details of verifiable mixnets and
to Adida [2] for a review of mixnets schemes.
2.7 Further Reading
We have briefly presented the cryptographic primitives necessary for our solu-
tions. We refer to Buchmann [15], Mao [68], and Katz-Lindell [61] for more
details about cryptographic techniques.
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Chapter 3
An Enhanced Ballot Box
This chapter covers part of the works published in Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections [5] - June/2007 and in 3rd international Conference on Electronic Vot-
ing [7] - August/2008. These are joint work with Ricardo F. Custo´dio and Jeroen
van de Graaf, and with Peter Y. A. Ryan, respectively.
3.1 Introduction
Traditional paper-based voting has a number of threats associated to the tabu-
lation phase. Votes, for instance, may be added, excluded, or replaced during
this process. Aiming at addressing these threats, in 2001 Custo´dio [30] presented
a new paper-based scheme in which voters sign votes. This is performed with
handwritten signatures. Voters, though, do not sign their own votes, but ran-
dom chosen votes. To accomplish this, the scheme employs a concept of ballot
box called Farnel in which voters cast their votes and receive random selected
ones that are then signed. The scheme, however, is not voter-verifiable, relies on
physical signatures to achieve security, and requires trustworthy authorities.
In this chapter we introduce an enhanced Farnel ballot box. The novel concept
contains extra functionalities and is a component of the voter-verifiable schemes
presented in the next chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews Custo´dio’s voting
scheme. After this, we introduce our concept of ballot box in Section 3.3 as well
as its properties and discuss its implementation. Section 3.4 shows the process of
initialization of the new box. Next, in Section 3.5, we introduce the parameters
of the box and discuss its specification. Finally, this chapter is concluded in
Section 3.6.
3.2 The Farnel Voting Scheme
In order to show how the Farnel box performs originally, we present here a de-
scription of Custo´dio’s proposal.
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The Farnel voting scheme uses two ballot boxes, that is, a Farnel box and a
conventional box. The former is a special box that shuﬄes votes. This box is
publicly initialized before the voting starts with ballots filled out and signed by a
honest authority. The set of initial ballots represents, with an equal probability,
all possible votes. The conventional ballot box starts the voting empty.
In order to vote, the voter receives a blank valid ballot (signed by a honest
ballot authority), makes her choice, and casts the ballot into the Farnel ballot
box. Then, through manual or mechanical shuﬄing, the Farnel box presents a
ballot, chosen randomly from its current set of votes, to the voter. After receiving
the ballot, the voter signs and drops it into the conventional box.
After the voting period has finished, the authority opens and signs a second
time all the votes of the Farnel box and adds them into the conventional box.
Then the conventional box is opened and all ballots are counted. From this result
the ballots from the initialization step are discounted.
The original Farnel scheme is not voter-verifiable. That is, the voters do not
obtain receipts to verify their votes were correctly tallied. However, the scheme
has interesting properties. Anyone can verify that all ballots were signed by
the precinct and that some of them were also signed by the voters. Therefore,
ballots cannot be replaced because the fraudulent votes are not signed by the
honest authority. Moreover, anyone can check who voted without obtaining the
list of voters. This is performed by checking the voters’ signatures on the votes.
Addition and exclusion of votes after the voting phase can be detected by checking
the total number of votes.
3.3 New Functionalities of the Farnel Ballot Box
In the original concept introduced by Custo´dio, the Farnel box is able to shuﬄe
its contents. For this, it is supposed to have a shuﬄing mechanism. In addition,
the box is initialized with a set of votes before the voting starts. At time of
voting, after receiving a vote, it shuﬄes the vote along with other previous cast
votes and outputs one random vote. The extra votes cast before the voting are
subtracted from the total in the tabulation.
The voter-verifiable schemes presented in the next Chapter are based on the
Farnel idea. However, in order to accomplish the schemes, we expand the original
concept. In other words, we supply the Farnel box with two more functionalities.
That is, besides shuﬄing its contents, the box is able to remove scratch surfaces
and to copy some of its elements. From these additional features, we describe the
new concept of the Farnel box as follows:
It is a ballot box equipped with mechanisms to remove scratch surfaces, to
shuﬄe its elements, and to make copies in a memoryless way. The box contains
an initial set of elements cast before the voting. At the time of voting, it is able
to receive an element, to add it to its initial set, to shuﬄe the new set, to copy
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one or more randomly selected elements from its set, and to output the copies.
In the schemes introduced later, the elements of the enhanced Farnel box are
either votes or receipts. That is, if the box is initialized with votes, then it
receives votes from the voters. If it is initialized with receipts, then it receives
receipts from the voters. However, the box outputs only receipts, that is, copies
of its elements. Depending on the box elements, the receipts may be either in a
plaintext or in an encrypted form. Plaintext receipts expose their corresponding
votes during the voting. The choice of a particular voter cannot be traced, though.
Encrypted receipts reveal their votes only after being decrypted in the tabulation.
From now the terms (dummy) ballots or elements are used to refer to votes (or
receipts) cast into the Farnel box.
Aiming at complementing the description of the new concept, we introduce
next a formal specification of our Farnel box. We use the process algebra CSP
(see Schneider [86] for more information) for this and specify the box as follows:
Let Init denote the initial set of dummy ballots with which the box is initialized.
Let l denote the number of receipts to be output to each voter when they cast
their votes and ballots the set of all possible ballots. Then the Farnel box will
start in state Farnel(Init) and its subsequent behavior is defined recursively as:
Farnell(X) := cast?b : Ballots→ Farnell(X ∪ {b})→ receipt!r : ℘l(X ∪ {b})
The notation ℘l(X) denotes the set of subsets of X of cardinality l.
In other words, the Farnel ballot box is parametrised by the integer l and its
initialization Init. At any point, the box accepts a ballot b and adds it to its
current set X. After which, it outputs a set ballots of size l chosen at random
from its new set X ∪ {b}.
We employ this concept in the rest of this work and assume that the
Farnel box selects its elements uniformly at random to perform the
copies.
An Alternative Concept
In the description above, the Farnel box shuﬄes the element that it receives along
with its elements before outputting the copies. This way, a copy of the element
received may appear in the output. However, the box may perform differently.
That is, instead of adding the input element to its set first and then shuﬄing, the
box adds the element to the set only after outputting the copies. As consequence,
the input element has no chance to be copied before the next input. Considering
the notation introduced above, this variation of the new Farnel concept can be
specified in the process algebra CSP formally as follows:
Farnell(X) := cast?b : Ballots→ receipt!r : ℘l(X)→ Farnell(X ∪ {b})
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As before, the notation ℘l(X) denotes the set of subsets of X of cardinality l.
The Farnel ballot box now is parametrised by the integer l and its initialization
Init. The box receives a ballot b at any time. After this, it outputs a set ballots
of size l chosen at random from its current set X. Then, the new ballot is added
to X and the box is ready to receive the next ballot.
3.3.1 Security Properties
The original Farnel box performs by anonymizing votes. That is, it receives a
vote, shuﬄes it jointly with other previous cast votes, and outputs a random
selected vote. This property is inherited by the enhanced box as well. However,
there are two differences. First, the elements of the new box are votes or receipts.
Second, it outputs copies of its elements instead of the original ones.
In order to anonymize the elements received, the original and the enhanced
Farnel box depend on an initial set of dummy elements. This initial set helps
preserving the voter’s anonymity as will be discussed later. The anonymity af-
forded by the original Farnel as well as by its enhanced version, though, relies on
the following requisite:
Requisite of the Farnel Box. The dummy elements and the voters elements
cannot be distinguished.
In other words, this requisite means that no one should be able to verify the
elements output by the box are dummy or not. On the contrary, the Farnel box
may not ensure anonymity. Since the dummy elements are shuﬄed along with the
voters elements, these elements help anonymizing the voters elements. However,
if the distinction is possible, one needs just to distinguish the voters elements
to violate the anonymity of a voter. For example, considering the new Farnel
box, the first voter may vote and receive a copy of her own element as receipt; if
this happens, the voter’s anonymity would be violated as all other elements are
dummy.
Note that the box anonymizes elements at time of voting. Thus, in principle,
the contents of the box do not need to be anonymized again during the tabulation.
Though, this depends on how the Farnel box is initialized as will be presented in
Section 3.5.
Besides anonymizing elements, the enhanced Farnel box makes possible the
verification of its contents. In order to accomplish this, the box maintains all
elements it receives and outputs only copies of them. The copies are held by
the voters as their receipts and are used to verify the original elements and votes
during the tabulation.
This property of the enhanced box enables a new variant of voter-verifiability
in the schemes presented in the next Chapter. That is, instead of verifying their
own ballots as normally found in the literature, the voters verify subsets of the
box that may or may not include their elements.
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The verification provided by the new box, however, is probabilistic. That is,
because the copies are made from elements chosen at random, some elements may
be copied and others not.
3.3.2 Implementing the New Concept
The enhanced Farnel box has special features not existent in a conventional box.
It is able to remove scratch surfaces, and to shuﬄe its elements as well as to
copy some of them. A tombola (i.e. a raﬄe drum) could form the basis of an
implementation of the Farnel box. This mechanism is normally used in lottery
games to shuﬄe tickets. It is a box that contains a slit to receive items and that
can be spun to shuﬄe its contents.
A tombola adapted to remove scratch surfaces and a copy machine would be
sufficient to simulate the functionalities of the Farnel box. The tombola could
be initialized with elements by officials. During the voting, after the tombola
receives an element, the officials would spin it to shuﬄe its contents and then
take one or more random elements from it. The elements then would be copied
and cast back into the tombola. These procedures would be observed by voters
and by helper organizations to detect possible manipulation.
A more sophisticated Farnel box, however, could be built using the current
technology. The tombola could have a scanner adapted in its slit and a small
printer inside it. This way, the tombola would perform all functionalities of the
enhanced Farnel box without the contact of the authorities with the original
elements.
Besides being implemented as a physical ballot box, most of the new con-
cept may be employed in an electronic version. That is, with exception of the
mechanism for removing scratch surfaces, the shuﬄing and the copies could be
accomplished by a computer. For example, a direct recording electronic (DRE)
voting machine may generate internally votes as dummy elements. Each time a
voter votes using the DRE, it shuﬄes its contents and prints copies of random
votes as receipts. Cryptographic mechanisms are necessary to detect or prevent
malicious behaviors.
3.4 The Initialization Process
As described before, the Farnel box is initialized with dummy ballots. This
process takes place before the election and is performed by the officials in a public
session. The main objective is to cast a predefined number of dummy ballots
(i.e. votes or receipts) into the Farnel ballot box and to publish the number of
ballots cast per option on a bulletin board.
The initialization of the Farnel box is necessary mainly for ensuring the ano-
nymity of the early voters. As the Farnel receives a ballot from each voter and
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outputs copies of random selected ballots, it must have an initial set of elements
to choose from. Otherwise, after receiving early ballots, the Farnel would not
have enough elements to select at random and copy.
For some of the schemes that we present in Chapter 4, it is necessary to ensure
that ballots cast during the initialization are well-formed in some way. This will
typically involve some form of random auditing. Thus, for example, we might
require that 2x blank ballots be created beforehand. The officials perform the
following steps to initialize the ballot box:
1. Select x blank ballots at random and audit them as necessary. Ballots
audited are discarded;
2. Mark the other x unaudited blank ballots according to the number of votes
per option specified in advance;
3. Cast the x votes (or receipts) into the Farnel box and publish the number
of elements cast on the bulletin board.
Notice that some schemes in the next chapter employ a conventional and a
Farnel box. In these schemes, the conventional box is initialized with votes and
the Farnel is initialized with the corresponding receipts. Also, for schemes using
plaintext ballots, the auditing for well-formedness is not necessary and is omitted.
In order to prevent manipulation, the initialization process should be scruti-
nized by helper organizations. They should check the ballot box is empty before
it is initialized as well as verify all procedures above are performed correctly. Fur-
ther, the ballot box should be sealed and continually supervised by third parties
after the initialization. The seal is removed when the voting starts.
Initialization of the Farnel box with void ballots
Where we are using encrypted receipts we have an alternative way to initialize
the Farnel box: we include a void option on the ballots and initialize the box with
ballots representing votes for the void option. This has the advantage that we do
not have to keep a log of the actual votes cast for each option during initialization.
We do need a robust mechanism to ensure that all initializing votes are cast for
void, but it seems likely that this is easier to enforce than maintaining a record of
an initial tally. We can use this approach for the Preˆt-a`-Voter and ThreeBallot
style ballots, for example, but not where plaintext receipts are used.
3.5 The Parameters of the Farnel box
The Farnel box is initialized with a number of dummy elements (votes or receipts)
before the voting starts and outputs copies of its elements during the voting, as
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presented. The initial elements ensure the voter’s anonymity while the copies are
handed to the voter as her receipt. The number of dummy elements as well as
the number of copies given to each voter compose the parameters of the box.
Because the Farnel box outputs copies of random elements of its contents, it
may reveal information that affects the voter’s anonymity. For example, from
the copies the box could show that an element was cast before others. The in-
formation remains concealed until the tally if encrypted receipts are employed.
However, it would be revealed after the receipts be decoded (unless an anonymiz-
ing mix tabulation is used). The quantity of information revealed increases ac-
cording to the number of copies output by the box. The more copies the Farnel
box outputs, the more information about its elements it reveals. Consequently,
although more elements can be verified by the voters, the information revealed
may be sufficient to compromise the anonymity of one or more voters.
In order to preserve the anonymity of the voters, the dummy elements and the
voters elements cannot be distinguished through the copies output by the Farnel
box as stated in Section 3.3.1. The number of dummy elements is fundamental for
guaranteeing this. As the box outputs copies of previous cast elements for each
voter, the elements of the early voters have more chance to be output. Hence,
these elements may be distinguished from other elements. Depending on the
number of dummy elements, however, the chance of distinction is negligible as
the dummy elements may also be output.
To achieve verifiability while maintaining anonymity, the number of dummy
elements and the number of copies should be defined according to the following
requisites:
Requisite 1. The voter’s anonymity is preserved even if the Farnel box is able
to output a copy of her element.
Requisite 2. An individual receipt or a set of them do not provide enough in-
formation to distinguish dummy elements from voters elements.
Requisite 3. The number of copies of elements in all receipts is sufficient to
detect accuracy problems with an acceptable probability (i.e. the probability that
the corruption of any given ballot is detected be at least 50%).
We require that the voter should not be able to obtain any information other
than the options order of her ballot or the option she marked when casting her
ballot.
Taking into account these requisites, we consider a number of possible strategies
for initializing the box: ballots marked at random (with the totals carefully
recorded), a predetermined number of votes per option, votes for a void option,
or a combination of these methods. If we adopt an initialization with votes for
void, we must include a minimal number of votes for the other options. Otherwise,
the first voter may vote and receive a copy of her own vote as receipt.
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An initialization purely with void votes works only if we have mixes during the
tabulation. Although the anonymity is already provided by the Farnel mecha-
nism, it might still be useful in some contexts and does provide an extra layer of
protection.
In principle, an initialization with at least one element for each option may be
sufficient to preserve the voters’ anonymity. However, depending on the number
of voters and on the number of options, the anonymity may not be preserved.
For example, considering a voting with two options, one initial element for each
option, and two copies per voter as receipt. After the first voter casts her vote,
she may receive her element and an initial element for the same option from the
Farnel box.
3.5.1 Receipts and Verifiability
The Farnel box makes receipts for voters from elements of its contents. A receipt
is a copy of a random selected element and voters may receive one or more
receipts.
The probability of selection of an element depends on the number of items in
the box. The more elements the box has, the less is the chance of an element to
be selected. In addition, the probability is related to the number of receipts in
which an element may appear. The more receipts an element may appear, the
more is its chance to be selected. Elements cast early, in particular, have more
chance to be selected than others as they may appear in more receipts. For a
number of voters n and one receipt per voter, for example, the element of the first
voter may appear in n receipts while the element of the last voter may appear
only in the last receipt.
Considering the contents of the box when a voter casts her element, the prob-
ability of a copy of this element to appear at least once among the receipts is
as follows. Let n denote the number of voters, Init denote the number of initial
(dummy) elements, and l denote the number of receipts output per voter, the
probability to select the element of the voter i (1 6 i 6 n) is given by:
Pr[element i ] = 1−
[ n∏
j=i
(Init+ (j − 1)
Init+ j
)l]
(3.1)
Note that when the first l receipts are made, the box contains the initial ele-
ments and the element of the first voter (i.e. i = 1). Thus, the initial elements
have the same probability as the first element cast. Section 3.5.2 contains exper-
iments for different values l and Init.
The receipts aim at verifying the elements of the box and should detect cor-
ruption of these elements. However, the different probabilities of the elements
affects the verifiability. Elements with less chance to be output may not appear
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among the receipts and consequently cannot be verified. Conversely, elements
with more chance are more probable to be verified.
Apart from the different chances that the elements have, some elements may not
have receipts as the box performs random selections. Moreover, the box may have
more elements than the number of all possible receipts. Elements without receipts
could be corrupted by an adversary, but the identification of these elements is
hard to perform. First an adversary needs to observe all receipts to identify these
elements. The fact that some voters may refuse to do that renders this difficult.
Second, depending on the parameters defined, the Farnel box is able to output
receipts for most of its elements and this can be increase with extra receipts (see
below).
In general, the corruption of an element takes place at random. That is, during
the tabulation, an element is randomly chosen and then corrupted. The corrup-
tion should be detected by means of the receipts corresponding to the element.
However, as some elements may not have had copies output by the box, the de-
tection is probabilistic. The probability of detection of a corrupted element is as
follows:
Pr[detect a corruption] =
( Init+ 1
Init+ n
)
Pr[element 1 ] +
Init+n∑
j=Init+2
( 1
Init+ n
)
Pr[element j ] (3.2)
In this equation we suppose that all voters employ their receipts to verify the
corresponding elements and that corruptions take place only in the tallying phase.
Because the box is just opened in the tabulation and the elements are protected
inside it, we do not consider corruptions before this phase. In addition, the
voting process is observed by everyone (i.e. voters, observers, officials, etc.). This
prevents access to the box elements before the voting closes. See Section 3.5.2
for experiments with different values l and Init.
The equations presented above are related to the requisites of the parameters
introduced before. Requisites 1 and 2 corresponds to the anonymity and are
related to the Equation 3.1. Requisite 3 corresponds to the verifiability and
consequently to Equation 3.2.
Increasing the Verifiability with Extra Receipts
The fact that elements cast later have less chance to have copies among the
receipts affects the verifiability of the box contents. In order to increase the
chance of these elements, however, the box may output a set of extra receipts
at end of the voting. That is, after the last voter has obtained her receipt, the
Farnel box shuﬄes its contents (without receiving an input), copies a number of
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random selected elements, and outputs them. These receipts would be handed
to helper organizations and could be also published on the bulletin board.
As alternative, the box could also output additional receipts (for helper orga-
nizations) during the voting. These receipts would increase the chance of other
elements to appear on the receipts.
3.5.2 Parameters Specification
The parameters of the box should be specified according to the requirements
presented in Section 3.5. That is, the parameters should preserve the voters’
anonymity, should detect corruption of elements with sufficient probability, and
should prevent the distinction between voters and dummy elements. Because the
parameters are related to the voters’ anonymity and to the voter verifiability, the
specification depends on the number of voters. This way, we have three variables
to consider: the number of dummy elements Init, the number of receipts per
voter l, and the number of voters n.
The value Init has particular concern as the Farnel box can be initialized in
several ways (i.e. ballots marked at random, void ballots, etc.). Depending on
the kind of initialization, more elements per option may be necessary to ensure
anonymity and consequently the value Init increases. For now, we ignore how
the box is initialized.
We investigate below the specification of the parameters with regard to the
variables Init, l, and n. From these variables, we deduce the following:
1. A value l greater than Init may not ensure anonymity. The first voter,
for example, may vote and obtain her element and all dummy elements as
receipt.
2. For an Init greater than the number of voters n (e.g. 3 times greater), the
dummy elements will appear in more receipts than the voters elements. As
result, the elements cast by the voters and the dummy elements will be
almost statistically indistinguishable. If l is small (e.g. l = 1), an adversary
cannot violate the voters’ anonymity (in particular, the anonymity of the
early voters). A small l, though, affects the voter verifiability as the chance
of detecting corruption of elements decreases. The anonymity may be also
ensured for large values of l.
3. An Init equal to n also results in more dummy elements on the receipts as
these elements have more chance to be selected than the voters elements.
The dummy elements and the voters elements, though, are still almost
indistinguishable as the number of voters elements does not exceed the
number of dummy elements. The anonymity, though, can only be ensured
for small values of l; a greater l may endanger the anonymity.
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4. An Init less than n produces more voters elements on the receipts than
dummy elements. Consequently, an adversary has more chance to distin-
guish between the voters and the dummy elements. The distinction may
be possible even if l is small.
By these deductions, we observe that the verifiability and the anonymity prop-
erties are related. That is, more dummy elements mean more anonymity, but less
verifiability; conversely, more receipts mean more verifiability, but less anonymity.
In order to elucidate this relation, we present next the results of experiments.
The experiments employ the Equations 3.1 and 3.2 presented in Section 3.5.1.
They show the chances of all voters’ elements to appear at least once in the
subsequent receipts as well as the chance of detecting a corruption of an element
through the receipts. The experiments were performed with different values for
Init and for l, but with a fixed number of voters n = 500. The value 500 is about
the total number of votes cast per ballot box (or DRE) in Brazil. We employ a
number of receipts l from 1 to 5. Although a greater number of receipts could be
used, this would require more work from the voters to verify their receipts and
consequently a number of them could ignore the verification.
• Experiment 1 - Init > n
The first results are presented in the Figures 3.1 and 3.2. These figures show
the case where Init > n.
The Figures 3.1a and 3.2a show the chances of the voters’ elements to appear on
the receipts for Init = 1000 and for Init = 800, respectively. These results show
that for l = 1, even the elements cast early have less than 50% of probability to
have a copy output by the box. The chances, however, increase as more receipts
are employed. For l = 5, the elements of the first 20 voters have about 85%
chance in Figure 3.1a and 90% chance in Figure 3.2a. These elements as well as
the elements of the next voters cannot be distinguished from the dummy elements
as the Init value is sufficiently large and many more dummy elements will appear
on the receipts. This way, the voter’s anonymity is ensured.
The chances of detecting a corruption are showed in the figures 3.1b (for Init =
1000) and 3.2b (for Init = 800).
• Experiment 2 - Init = n
The experiments presented in Figure 3.3 show the case where Init = n, for
Init = n = 500.
The chances of the voters’ elements to appear on the receipts are presented in
Figure 3.3a. Due to the reduction of the number of dummy ballots, we observe
now that the chances increased compared to the last experiments. Especially, for
l = 5, the elements cast by the first 40 voters have about 95% chance to appear on
the receipts. Taking into account this number of receipt, the number of dummy
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Figure 3.1: Experiments for a number of dummy elements Init = 1000.
elements is still sufficient to preserve the voter’s anonymity. Although the value
Init is less than in the last experiments, the receipts will still be composed of
many more dummy elements than voters’ elements.
Figure 3.3b present the chance of detecting corruptions for a different number
of receipts.
• Experiment 3 - Init < n
The last experiments show the case where Init < n. These results are presented
in the Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
The Figures 3.4a and 3.5a show the probabilities of the voters’ elements, for
Init = 300 and for Init = 100. We call attention to the case where l = 5 in
both figures. In these results, for Init = 300 the first 20 elements cast by the
voters appear with about 99% probability on the receipts while for Init = 100 this
probability occurs for the first 138 elements. In the latter result, due to the high
number of early elements that will certainly appear on the receipts, the dummy
elements provide less anonymity for the early voters than in the experiments
presented before. The reason for this is explained as follows.
Observe that the total number of receipts is 2500 (i.e. l · n) and that the
dummy elements have the same probability as the element of the first voter
(i.e. about 99% here). As the dummy elements may appear in all receipts, we
expect more receipts for these elements. In the same way, we expect more receipts
for the first 138 voters’ elements as they also have about 99% chance and may
appear in more receipts than the subsequent elements. Considering all receipts
and Init = 100, 238 elements may appear on the receipts more than others.
Some of these elements are dummy and others are the elements of the first 138
voters. Consequently, the distinction between voters and dummy elements could
be performed among less elements than in the simulations presented before.
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Figure 3.2: Experiments for a number of dummy elements Init = 800.
Although when Init < n more voters’ elements may appear on the receipts, this
fact does not mean that the anonymity of a voter may be violated. As the dummy
elements appear on the receipts with the same probability of the first element
cast, they anonymize the voters elements and make the distinction difficult. This
anonymization, however, depends on the Init value. In addition, each element
cast by the voters help anonymizing the elements of the next voters.
The chance of detecting a corruption through the receipts is presented in the
figures 3.4b (for Init = 300) and 3.5b (for Init = 100).
3.5.3 Simulations
The last section presented experiments to clarify the anonymity and the verifiabil-
ity properties. These experiments, though, were based on the equations defined
in Section 3.5.1. We present now the result of voting simulations performed with
different parameters. These simulations, in particular, have the goal of verifying
the anonymity of the first voter could be compromised and corrupted elements
can be detected.
Anonymity
We have argued in the previous section that the anonymity and the verifiability
properties of the Farnel box are related and have demonstrated this through
experiments. As observed, initializations with large Init values (i.e. Init > n or
Init = n) provides better anonymity. These initializations, however, are only of
theoretical interest if a large number of voters is considered. They would require
much work from the officials and more control over the elements to decrease the
risk of manipulation. In order to avoid these drawbacks, the value Init should be
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Figure 3.3: Experiments for a number of dummy elements Init = 500.
as less as possible. A value Init < n, hence, is more appropriate.
On the other hand, an initialization with a small Init value exposes more
elements of early voters, as presented above. For Init = 100, for instance, we
have showed that the elements of the first 138 voters may appear more often on
the receipts than the elements of the next voters. As consequence, the receipts
could reveal information about the elements of early voters sufficient to violate
their anonymity. Especially, the anonymity of the first voter.
Recall from Section 3.5.1 that the element of the first voter and the dummy
elements have the same probability to appear on the receipts and that these
elements may appear in more receipts than others. By observing most of the
receipts, one could identify the element that appeared most often and conclude
that it is from the first voter. In order to verify the voter anonymity can be
violated in this way, we have implemented a simple program to perform simulated
voting.
The program implements the Farnel box by means of a linked list [27]. It
considers two candidates and initializations with the same number of elements
for these candidates. The elements are votes that are randomly generated and
are added to the list in random positions; each vote is identified uniquely. The
receipts are copies of randomly selected votes (identifiers) from the list. For
each election, after sorting the list based on the number of receipts, the program
returns the number of receipts in which the vote of the first voter appeared on
and the position of this element in the sorted list. Also, it shows whether more
votes had the same number of receipts as the vote of the first voter.
The simulations were performed with values Init = 10, 20, and 30. For each of
these values, 20 voting were performed. The number of dummy votes for each
candidate employed was half of Init. Also, they considered 5 receipts per voter
and 500 voters. Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 show the simulation results. Each point
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Figure 3.4: Experiments for a number of dummy elements Init = 300.
on the figures means one voting. The axes y show the position of the vote of the
first voter regarding the number of receipts issued in the voting. The values near
the points indicate the numbers of votes with the same number of receipts as the
vote of the first voter. The axes x show the number of receipts corresponding
to the vote of the first voter (or others as long as the values near the points are
greater than 1). In order to verify the vote of the first voter appeared more than
others on the receipts, we observed if this vote is on the first position and if it is
a unique element in this position.
Figure 3.6 presents simulations for Init = 10. In these simulations we expect
11 votes to appear more on the receipts (i.e. ten dummy votes and the vote of the
first voter). The simulations show that the anonymity of the first voter would
be violated in 2 out of 20 voting. That is, the vote of the first voter appears in
position 1 for a number of 26 and 28 receipts. Note that for 26 receipts another
vote obtains the same number of receipts as the voter’s vote. In this case, if
the votes were for different candidates, an adversary would need to distinguish
between the vote of the first voter from the other vote. However, considering all
simulations and the range [1; 28] in which the receipts corresponding to the voter’s
vote appear on, an adversary cannot be sure if the vote on the first position is
from the first voter or not.
The voting simulations for Init = 20 are showed in Figure 3.7. In these simula-
tions we expect more receipts for the 20 dummy votes and for the vote of the first
voter. No voting, however, had the vote of the first voter as the one with more
receipts. Comparing to the last simulations, observe that the number of receipts
obtained by the voter’s vote here are distributed over a larger range (i.e. [5; 72]);
also, the number of votes that have the same number of receipts as the voter’s
vote has increased. This would render even more difficult the association of a
number of receipts to the vote of the first vote, in a certain voting.
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Figure 3.5: Experiments for a number of dummy elements Init = 100.
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Figure 3.6: Simulations for Init = 10.
The last simulations are presented in Figure 3.8. They consider Init = 30
and the first 31 votes are the most expected on the receipts. The voting that
shows 28 receipts would reveal the vote of the first voter. In the other voting,
the receipts corresponding to the vote of the first voter are distributed over the
range [2; 102]. As before, the large interval as well as the number of votes with
the same number of receipts as the voter’s vote impede one to violate the voter’s
anonymity through the receipts.
Overall the anonymity of the first voter would not be compromised in the sim-
ulations if one is able to observe all receipts. This is true since the exact number
of receipts corresponding to the voter’s vote cannot be determined. However,
the simulations show that by reducing the number of dummy votes, the range
in which the voter’s vote may appear is reduced as well. If the range is much
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Figure 3.7: Simulations for Init = 20.
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Figure 3.8: Simulations for Init = 30.
smaller, we deduce that the vote of the first voter would appear more often in
the first position and this would endanger the voter’s anonymity.
Verifiability
As stated in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.5.1, the new Farnel concept provides probabilis-
tic verifiability since some votes may have receipts and others not. Although an
adversary cannot identify votes without receipts and corrupt them, he may try
to corrupt random votes after the voting.
While performing the simulated voting presented above, we have also verified
whether corruptions could be detected by means of the receipts. That is, at
the end of each voting, some votes are corrupted and it is verified they have
corresponding receipts. In order to accomplish this, all receipts (i.e. copies of
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votes) generated during the voting were stored; then some votes were selected at
random from the linked list (i.e. the Farnel box) and compared with the receipts.
Detection of corrupted votes, hence, resulted on votes from the linked list that
matched receipts.
In each voting, a number of 20 votes were corrupted at random. Because these
simulations were performed along with the last ones, they have employed the same
set up. That is, 500 voters, 5 receipts per voter, and a number of dummy votes
Init = 10, 20, and 30. Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.1 show the results of 15 simulations
for Init = 10, 20, and 30, respectively. Each line in the tables corresponds to a
voting. The columns present the numbers of votes that were detected by the
receipts and that were corrupted.
Detected Corrupted
18 2
15 5
15 5
17 3
16 4
15 5
18 2
18 2
18 2
17 2
16 4
19 1
17 3
18 2
19 1
Table 3.1: Detecting cor-
ruptions for Init = 10.
Detected Corrupted
14 6
18 2
15 5
14 6
18 2
18 2
16 4
17 3
14 6
16 4
17 3
17 3
19 1
17 3
16 4
Table 3.2: Detecting cor-
ruptions for Init = 20.
Detected Corrupted
20 0
14 6
17 3
18 2
17 3
16 4
16 4
16 4
16 4
17 3
18 2
19 1
18 2
17 3
17 3
Table 3.3: Detecting cor-
ruptions for Init = 30.
As expected most of the corrupted votes would be detected for the parameters
used. Though, we can observe that more dummy votes means more chance for
the adversary to succeed.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have introduced a novel concept of ballot box based on the
Farnel approach. In the new concept, the ballot box not only anonymizes its
elements, but it also provides copies of its elements as receipts to the voters.
This allows a new variant of voter-verifiability in the schemes presented in the
next chapter. In addition, we have detailed the initialization process required by
our proposal and defined its parameters.
We have also showed the specification of the parameters through experiments
and simulations. As stated, less initial elements increase the verifiability, but may
undermine the anonymity depending on the number of receipts and the number
of voters. In our simulations, we have employed a small number of initial votes
and verified that the privacy of the first voter was not violated. We have also
performed simulations to verify votes corrupted after the voting could be detected
through the receipts.
In the next chapter we assume the existence of ballot box presented in order
to introduce the novel voter-verifiable schemes.
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Chapter 4
Voter-Verifiable Voting Schemes
This chapter is a combination of two works: the first one is joint work with
Ricardo F. Custo´dio and Jeroen van de Graaf. It has been published in Workshop
on Trustworthy Elections [5] - June/2007 and will appear on Towards Trustworthy
Election Systems book [21]. The second one is joint work with Peter Y. A. Ryan
and has been published in 3rd international Conference on Electronic Voting [7]
- August/2008.
4.1 Introduction
Voter-verifiable voting schemes allow voters to verify their votes are accurately
counted by means of protected receipts. Because voters are able to detect count-
ing errors or possible manipulation of the results, these schemes usually afford
more security guarantees and require less trust in their components than tra-
ditional voting. Voters, though, cannot use their receipts to compromise their
privacy, even if they are prepared to cooperate with adversaries.
Schemes that provide this security feature, such as Preˆt-a`-Voter [83, 22], usually
employ cryptographic mechanisms (e.g. mixnets) to ensure security. However,
Randell-Ryan [78] and Rivest [80] introduced solutions that do not require these
techniques. Whereas these schemes are simple and can be more easily understood
by the voters, they provide less security guarantees than the cryptographic based
ones. In the proposal of Rivest, the ballot secrecy is not perfect and it may leak
statistical indications about the results in the course of the voting. The scheme
proposed in [78] requires extra mechanisms to prevent malicious officials from
altering votes in the tabulation.
In this chapter we first introduce a novel voter-verifiable voting scheme. The
proposal does not require cryptography, while avoiding receipts from leaking re-
sults before the voting ends. As the previous proposals, however, it does not
achieve the same security levels as cryptography based schemes. Thus, with the
goal of achieving more guarantees than our first solution, we present two schemes
that employ cryptography. These schemes, though, require just a commitment
protocol. In addition to these proposals, we introduce new versions of Rivest and
Randell-Ryan voting schemes that aim at overcoming their drawbacks. The new
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solutions are based on our initial schemes.
Our solutions are paper-based and rely on the enhanced Farnel ballot box
introduced in Chapter 3. Also, they employ a novel variant of voter-verifiability.
That is, instead of verifying their own votes, voters are able to verify one or more
random votes.
The next section presents basic aspects related to our solutions. Section 4.3 in-
troduces a voter-verifiable scheme that does not rely on cryptography. Section 4.4
presents an improved version of the previous scheme that employs cryptography.
Section 4.5 shows a scheme that requires only a Farnel box. After that, Sec-
tion 4.6 and Section 4.7 present improved versions of the Threeballot and the
Randell-Ryan schemes. Finally, this chapter is concluded in Section 4.8.
4.1.1 Related Work
The proposals presented in this chapter are related to Preˆt-a`-Voter [83, 22] and
Punchscan [77] as well as their variants, such as Ryan-Schneider [85], Scratch-and-
Vote [3], van de Graaf [93], and Xia et al. [96, 97] schemes. In addition, they are
related to the ThreeBallot [80, 82] and to the Randell-Ryan [78] schemes. These
proposals employ paper ballot and are voter-verifiable. Our proposals, however,
differ from these previous works basically in two ways. First, we employ a special
ballot box and anonymize votes (or receipts) at the time of voting. Instead, the
ThreeBallot and the Randell-Ryan schemes require conventional ballot boxes.
Preˆt-a`-Voter and Punchscan employ cryptographic techniques and anonymize
votes during the tallying. Second, in these previous works the voter verifies her
own vote was correctly tallied, whereas in our proposals she verifies one or more
random votes. Because our proposals are paper based, we do not consider here
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) based schemes, such as Bingo Voting [10],
Moran-Naor [70], and Chaum [19] solutions.
A solution similar to the scheme we introduced in [5] (see Section 4.3), that
also relates to our other solutions, appeared independently in [82]. This scheme
is also based on the original Farnel, but it employs a different concept. That is,
it does not require initialization of a ballot box, it does not issue receipts for all
voters, and each voter receives just one receipt.
4.2 Common Properties of the Protocols
The schemes presented later share some common properties as participants and
security goals, and are related to some known attacks. We introduce here these
common features regarding our solutions.
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4.2.1 Participants and their Role in the Voting Process
A voting scheme involves participants that perform determined functions. We
introduce next the participants and their roles in our proposals.
Voter The voter casts her vote and receives one or more receipts for checking
votes later. In addition, she has the possibility to audit ballot forms in
public before voting. When necessary, helper organizations assist the voter
to perform this inspection. She also employs her receipts to verify votes on
the bulletin board.
Voting Authorities These authorities are responsible to initialize publicly bal-
lot boxes (e.g. the Farnel box) and audit ballot forms. In addition, they
hold a set of sealed envelopes containing blank ballots and a list of eligible
voters. This list is employed to authenticate voters during the voting as
conventionally. Note that these tasks can also be performed by different
authorities. That is, a set of authorities initializes the box and another
holds the envelopes.
Talliers The talliers are responsible for opening the ballot box and for counting
the votes. Here, they should also publish the contents of the ballot box on
the bulletin board and inspect votes when necessary.
Helper Organizations and Observers These parties supervise the whole voting
process and verify the information publicly available. Helper organizations,
especially, support voters to audit ballots. This process requires computers
in some schemes presented later. However, as voters are not supposed to
employ their own computers to inspect ballots, they select organizations
to publicly perform this. Note that all other participants may perform as
observers.
We assume that the eligible voters were previously registered by one or more
trustyworthy registrars.
4.2.2 Known Attacks on Voter-verifiable Schemes
Voter-verifiable schemes provide mechanisms to detect a number of threats in-
trinsic in traditional voting. However, some threats exist for these schemes. We
describe here three of them and their countermeasures. We concentrate on these
three attacks because they are strongly associated to our proposed schemes.
Chain Voting Attack
The chain voting is a threat inherent in almost all paper-based voting. In this
attack, an adversary smuggles a valid blank ballot, marks an option on it, and
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corrupts a voter to use this ballot. After voting, the voter returns to the adversary
the blank ballot received from the officials. The adversary then can use the fresh
ballot to corrupt another voter in the same way. (See also Jones [56]).
A countermeasure for this attack was proposed by Harris [47]. He suggested to
include on each ballot a tear-off slip containing a unique identifier. This number
is recorded by the officials before handing the ballot to the voter. Before the
voter casts her vote, the officials verify the slip is intact and the number on it is
the same recorded, and remove the slip.
Because the schemes presented in this chapter can be adapted to include Harris’
countermeasure, we disregard this attack.
Randomization Attack
In 2000, Schoenmakers [88] pointed out that the scheme proposed by Hirt and
Sako [48] is vulnerable to the randomization attack. In this attack, an adversary
forces the voter to cast an arbitrary vote with the goal of nullifying the voter’s
choice with high probability.
The randomization attack, however, is also applicable to some voter-verifiable
schemes of which receipts rely on randomization. In order to perform the attack,
an adversary instructs the voter to generate a receipt that has a certain property.
For example, a receipt marked in a determined position. The attacker will not
know what vote will be encoded, this is effectively random. The effect of this
attack then is to force voters to vote for a random candidate, so nullifying their
right to vote freely.
The Preˆt-a`-Voter and the Punch Scan voter-verifiable schemes are vulnerable
to this attack. In these schemes, the voter receipt contains the position chosen by
the voter. This way, an adversary may ask the voter to place her X in a specific
position and to show him afterwards the receipt marked in this position.
The Farnel idea mitigates this attack as we point out. The voter can be required
to replace her receipt by another one before leaving the precinct. This way, an
adversary cannot determine whether the voter followed his instructions because
the Farnel box returns a random selected receipt. As requisite, though, the voter’s
receipt cannot be exposed before being exchanged. Otherwise, an adversary could
obtain information to mount the attack by observing the original receipt, for
instance, the voter’s selections as in Preˆt-a`-Voter or Punch Scan.
Most of the schemes introduced in this chapter employ a Farnel box and thus
are able to overcome randomization attacks. They, however, relax the requisite
of hiding the receipts before exchanging it as this can be accomplished by em-
ploying envelopes. That is, receipts are first inserted into envelopes before being
exchanged. Note that the envelopes should be employed along with Harris’ so-
lution; otherwise, malicious voters could replace other receipts instead of their
own.
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Psychological Attacks
In voter-verifiable schemes, such as Preˆt-a`-Voter, the voter’s receipt includes a
ciphertext. This cryptographic material along with other information prevent the
voter from using her receipt to reveal her vote. At same time, these information
allow the voter to verify her vote. For example, Preˆt-a`-Voter’s receipt includes
an encryption and a mark for the chosen candidate (see also Section 4.4.1). The
voter verifies the same encryption and mark (in the same position as the receipt)
are published on the bulletin board.
The ciphertext reveals the voter’s choice if decrypted from the receipt. How-
ever, because an adversary has no access to the secret key, he cannot decrypt
the ciphertext and compromise the vote’s secrecy. This secret key is normally
shared among a set of talliers and decryptions are performed in cooperation. The
adversary, though, could persuade a voter that the secrecy of her vote is not
guaranteed. For example, he could convince his victim that he can extract her
choice from the ciphertext and thus induce her to vote for his candidates. This
attack is absolutely psychological as the adversary cannot obtain the vote from
the ciphertext.
The main point in psychological attacks is that the voter’s receipt corresponds
to the voter’s vote. This way, an adversary can use this fact and persuade voters.
The Farnel mechanism, though, mitigates these attacks. Because the Farnel may
exchange receipts, voters do not retain their own receipts. Thus, any fear that
the vote can be extracted should be mitigated.
Observe that these attacks may work in schemes that do not employ cryptog-
raphy as well. In the Threeballot scheme (see Section 4.6.1 for an overview), for
example, an adversary could convince a voter that he knows the other two parts
that compose the three ballots.
4.3 A Two Boxes Scheme
We present now a two boxes scheme that is voter-verifiable. It applies the new
variant of voter-verifiability in which voters verify random votes. The verification
may include their votes or not.
The scheme does not employ cryptography as the previous proposals of Rivest
[80, 82] and of Randell-Ryan [78]. It relies on numbers to identify the ballots and
the voter retains copies of these numbers as receipt.
4.3.1 Requisites
The Ballot Form
The scheme employs a ballot form composed of two halves. The first half is not
much different from the layout traditionally used in elections. It contains a list
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of voting options (including a blank option) where next to each option there is a
bubble to select it. It also contains an identification number (ID) which identifies
the ballot uniquely and associates it to the voting. The second half contains only
the same ID. The halves are separated by a perforation to allow detachment and
the IDs are covered by scratch surfaces. These surfaces prevent anyone from
learning the ballot ID before the ballot be marked.
The ballot form can be additionally described as follows. Let C be a set of
options available, I a set of positive integers sufficiently large, and ID a unique
number in I. The first half contains C, ID. The second half contains only the
same ID. Figure 4.1 illustrates this ballot form.
Figure 4.1: The ballot form of the two boxes scheme.
The IDs on both halves should be easy to compare and difficult to remember.
The voter should compare the IDs to detect a possible malformation of her ballot
form (i.e. a form with different IDs) and should not be able to remember it
afterwards. Although these properties seem to be contradictory and difficult to
implement, barcodes could be used to encode IDs and prevent the voters to recall
them. Voters could compare barcodes easily as long as they are thick enough.
The Ballot Boxes
The scheme requires two ballot boxes. One of them is a conventional box. This
box is initialized with filled out, dummy ballots (i.e. just the first half of the
ballots). The other ballot box is a Farnel box as defined in Section 3.3. It is
initialized with the halves of the dummy ballots that contain the IDs.
4.3.2 The Scheme
Before the Voting
In this phase, the authorities establish the Farnel parameters. That is, they define
the number of receipts l and the number of dummy ballots Init. After defining
Init, the authorities determine the number of ballots marked per candidate (see
Section 3.5 for details). Also, they publicly initialize the boxes through the ap-
proach described in Section 3.4. Before this initialization, though, the authorities
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audit some ballots. This audit is performed by detaching the scratch surfaces and
then by comparing the IDs of random chosen blank ballots apart.
In order to initialize the boxes, the authorities hold a number of (entire) blank
ballots and tear each of them in two along the perforation. Next, they mark an
option on each of the parts containing the options, detach their layers, and cast
them into the conventional ballot box; the number of votes marked per option
were defined before. The authorities then scratch away the layers of the other
parts (the slips that contain copies of the IDs) and cast them into the Farnel
ballot box. Note that neither the authority nor third parties should be able to
record or remember the IDs of the dummy votes.
Voting
After proving her eligibility to the voting authorities, the voter receives a blank
ballot form in a sealed envelope. She can audit this form or use it to vote. In
order to audit a ballot, she detaches its scratch surfaces and compares the IDs in
the presence of the authorities. This ballot form is discarded and the authorities
hand the voter a new blank form. If any ballot fails the audit checks, then
recovery mechanisms will need to be invoked. The voter performs the following
steps to vote and to obtain her receipt (see also Figure 4.2).
1. Verifying and filling out the ballot form
In the voting booth, the voter scratches away the layer covering the IDs of
her ballot and matches them (a). If they are equal, she marks one of the
options available (b);
2. Casting the vote
The voter separates the two parts of the ballot form (c). She then casts the
part containing the ballot ID and the options into the conventional ballot
box (d). The other part, showing only the ID, is cast into the Farnel ballot
box (e).
3. Obtaining the receipt
The Farnel ballot box shuﬄes its contents (f) and copies l IDs as receipt
to the voter (g).
Observe that here the Farnel box does not remove scratch surfaces and that
the voter compares the IDs. An alternative to avoid this comparison is to use
a mechanism to remove the surfaces in the box. The scheme now would require
an auditing to check ballots before the voter receives her blank ballot. The voter
would cast her vote without detaching the scratch surfaces.
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Figure 4.2: Main voting steps of the two boxes voter-verifiable scheme.
Tallying the Votes
In a public session, the talliers open the two ballot boxes and publish their con-
tents on the bulletin board. To compute the results of the election, the talliers
count all votes. The dummy votes cast in the initialization phase are subtracted
from the sums yielding the final result.
Vote Verification
Anyone can check on the bulletin board whether each vote from the conventional
ballot box has a corresponding ID in the Farnel ballot box. In addition, the voters
confirm whether their receipts (i.e. the IDs) match to votes on the bulletin board.
If one vote and its ID were not published, the voter complains by showing her
receipt to a voting authority.
4.3.3 Evaluation
The scheme relies essentially on the special ballot form and on the Farnel box.
The combination of these components along with the bulletin board preserve the
voter privacy and achieve verifiability.
Upon receiving the ID from the voter, the Farnel box returns her copies of
random selected IDs. As the voter cannot remember the ID of her own vote
and as the IDs are random, the voter cannot violate her privacy and prove to an
adversary which ID belongs to her vote. She can only attempt to guess the ID
of a specific candidate from her receipts. This way, the scheme ensures privacy.
The scheme can be verified by voters and third parties. Everyone can detect
duplication, elimination, substitution, and addition of votes. The detection is
accomplished by checking the information published on the bulletin board. Du-
plicates can be identified by checking if the IDs of the votes published are unique.
Anyone can also detect elimination and substitution of votes. Every vote on the
board should have a corresponding ID published. The addition of votes can be
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detected through the total number of votes published. The total should be the
sum of the number of initial votes and of the number of voters that cast their
votes.
Moreover, voters can independently match their receipts (i.e. the IDs) to the
votes on the board. Note, though, that the detection is probabilistic since not all
votes may have their IDs printed on the receipts.
In order to achieve these security guarantees, however, the scheme requires
trustworthy talliers. Also, the talliers should supervise strictly the votes from
the opening of the conventional ballot box until the publication of all votes on
the bulletin board. Otherwise, an adversary (e.g. a malicious tallier) may replace
votes without being detected.
Suppose an adversary has access to the set of votes of the conventional ballot
box before the votes are published on the bulletin board. In order to replace a
vote, the adversary smuggles a vote from the set, makes a fake vote for a different
option but using the same ID of the vote smuggled, and includes the fake vote
in the set. This way, after publishing all ballots, the fake vote would appear on
the board instead of the smuggled one.
This attack would undermine the accuracy of the scheme. Because votes are
verified through the IDs, voters and third parties would not detect the replace-
ment of the original vote by the fake one.
Hence, in order to ensure security, the scheme requires more control over the
votes or other anti-counterfeiting measures to prevent the threat. We introduce
next a scheme that does not need such requisites.
4.4 A Two Boxes Scheme with Cryptography
In the last section we have introduced a scheme that does not employ cryptog-
raphy and that is voter-verifiable. The scheme, however, requires trustworthy
talliers to fulfill this requirement. With the goal of avoiding this strong requisite,
we introduce here an improved scheme based on the previous proposal.
The improved solution employs a new ballot design and relies on cryptography
to achieve security.
4.4.1 New Receipt Style
The receipt employed in the last scheme has no dependence to the voter’s choice.
It is only connected to the options’ list. This way, an adversary can replace votes
without being detected. In order to detect this problem, a receipt should include
some information related to the choice.
In principle, as the Farnel box anonymizes receipts, the information on the
receipt could include the option chosen. For example, considering the previous
scheme, we could employ the option’s half as receipt instead of the ID half.
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However, because each receipt would expose a vote, a set of receipt could reveal
indications of the results before voting ends. Premature results in voting are
undesirable as they could influence voters to vote for the winning candidate or
the losing one.
A related problem occurs in the Twin [82] and in the Threeballot [80, 82]
voting schemes. A receipt in Twin is a copy of a vote while in Threeballot a
receipt reveals part of the options chosen. In both schemes, by observing a set
of receipts an adversary is able to obtain statistical information about the voting
results before the voting closes. Section 4.6.1 presents more details about this
problem in the Threeballot scheme.
In order to overcome these problems while avoiding trust in the officials, a
receipt should fulfill the following requisites:
1. It should detect accuracy problems (e.g. deletion, replacement, etc.) con-
sidering any adversary including dishonest talliers;
2. It should be related to the voter’s choice;
3. It should not reveal the choice before the voting closes.
Preˆt-a`-Voter Ballot Design
Preˆt-a`-Voter [83, 22] is a cryptographic voter-verifiable voting scheme that em-
ploys a special ballot design. The ballot is composed of two halves that are
separated vertically by perforations. The left half contains the options list in
a randomized order. The right half contains the corresponding spaces to select
the options and a mixnet onion (i.e. a ciphertext formed of encryption layers as
described in Section 2.6) on the bottom. The voter marks her option on the
right half and discards the left half. The receipt is a copy of the right half and
the original half is cast. All the right halves are published on the bulletin board
after the voting and the votes are computed from the marks and from the mixnet
onion on the halves.
The ballot design employed in the Preˆt-a`-Voter scheme satisfies the requisites
above. The receipt includes the voter’s choice without revealing the choice di-
rectly. That is, as the options are randomized and the receipt contains only
a mark in a determined position, the receipt does not reveal the choice. Also,
because the receipt is a copy of the left half that is published on the bulletin
board and the vote is reconstructed from this half, the receipt detects accuracy
problems.
The schemes we introduce here and in the next sections employ ballot forms
based on the Preˆt-a`-Voter design. They, however, do not rely on mixnet onions.
The new ballot forms are also inspired by the ideas of Randell-Ryan [78] and of
Scratch-and-Vote [3] schemes.
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4.4.2 Requisites
The Ballot Form
The ballot form here is formed of two pages that are overlaid initially. The top
page has a list of voting options in a random order and each option is associated
to a bubble to select it. The top page also contains a commitment to the list
of options and its respective decommitment value. The bottom page contains
the same bubbles and the same commitment of the top page. The commitment
printed on both pages as well as the value to open it in the top page are covered
by scratch surfaces. These surfaces now prevent anyone (including the voter)
from learning the commitments and its decommitment before the vote is cast. A
carbon mechanism transfers the selections made on the top page to the bottom
page (see Figure 4.3 for an example of this ballot form).
This design is also described as follows. Let C be a set of options available, piC
the permutation of C, H a secure hash function used here as commitment, and
r a random number from a large (key) space. piC , H(piC , r), r, and bubbles to
select an option compose the top page. The bottom page contains only H(piC , r)
and the bubbles in the same position as the top page.
Figure 4.3: A ballot form in the two boxes scheme with cryptography. On the
right the two pages of the ballot and on the left the pages overlaid can be seen.
The Ballot Boxes
As in the previous solution, the scheme employs a conventional ballot box as well
as a Farnel box (see Chapter 3 for details).
4.4.3 The Scheme
Before the Voting
The authorities perform the same steps described in Section 4.3.2. That is, they
define the number of receipts l and the number of dummy ballots Init, audit a
number of blank ballots, and initialize the boxes as presented in Section 3.4.
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Due to the new ballot form, however, the audit process is executed differently.
In order to audit a blank ballot, the authorities now scratch off the layers on the
top and on the bottom pages. After this, they hash the options along with the
key r revealed on the top page. Then, they match the resulting hash with the
hash values printed on the top and on the bottom page.
The conventional box here is initialized with marked top pages while the Farnel
box receives the corresponding bottom pages. The authorities, though, do not
scratch off the surfaces before casting the ballot pages. Upon receiving the bottom
pages, the Farnel box removes their scratches; the other scratches are detached
in the tallying phase.
Voting
In the voting phase, upon proving her eligibility to the officials, the voter receives
a sealed envelope with a blank ballot. If required by the voter, her ballot can be
audited (as above) and she receives a new blank ballot. As in the first proposed
scheme, recovery mechanisms are necessary if any ballot check fails. The voter
performs the following steps to vote:
1. Selecting the option
In the voting booth, the voter marks her choice on the top page and it is
transferred to the bottom page;
2. Verifying the ballot
She then inserts her ballot into a special envelope, which has transparent
borders and a window to show just the scratch surface. After this, she
hands the envelope to the authorities. They verify the surface on the top
page is intact and the voter did not separate the two pages;
3. Casting the top page
The voter separates the pages of the ballot and casts the top page into the
conventional ballot box;
4. Obtaining the receipt
She casts the bottom page into the Farnel box. The box shuﬄes its contents
and outputs copies of random selected bottom pages as receipt.
The scheme can be adapted to prevent a malicious voter from casting a ballot
different from the received one. For example, the ballot can include a number
that is removed before the voter casts her vote. This technique would be similar
to the solution of Harris for chain voting attacks presented in Section 4.2.2.
Observe that the special envelope prevents the authorities from learning the
voter’s choice while verifying the surfaces and the pages were not separated before.
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Tallying the Votes
As the scheme presented in the last section, the contents of the two ballot boxes
are published on a bulletin board. However, the scratch surface on the top pages
should be removed before publishing the pages and the commitments should be
decommited to verify the ballots. That is, the random number and the options
on the top page are hashed together and the resulting hash is compared with the
hash on the ballot. The results are computed from the top pages.
Verifying the Votes
From the information on the board, everyone can perform the same procedures
as the talliers to verify the votes. The voters, especially, match their receipts
with the corresponding bottom pages on the board.
4.4.4 Evaluation
As the proposal presented before, the security of the scheme here depends on the
ballot boxes and on the ballot form. Due to the new ballot design, however, the
scheme does not requires trustworthy talliers.
The votes are tabulated from the top pages and the receipts are made from
the bottom pages (without the scratch surfaces). Because each bottom page
contains the same selections of its corresponding top page and also includes the
commitment to the options on the top page, an adversary cannot replace a top
page by another with a different permutation or with a selection for a different
option, without being detected. Moreover, since the bottom page does not include
the option selected, an adversary cannot use receipts to obtain indication of
the results before the voting closes. Thus, the new ballot design satisfies the
requirements presented in Section 4.4.1.
The ballot design contains commitments that could be saved by a malicious
voter and used later to violate her privacy. These commitments, though, are
covered by scratch surfaces and the authorities verify the surfaces are intact
before allowing the voter to cast her vote. This way, the scheme prevents the
voter from obtaining any information (except the option she selected and the
ballot’s permutation) from her ballot form.
A voting accomplished through this scheme can be verified by voters and third
parties. Everyone can verify on the bulletin board each top page has a corre-
sponding bottom page with the same hash and check both pages are marked in
the same position. Also, by hashing the options and the key, everyone can verify
the vote. Voters, especially, can match their receipts with the bottom pages on
the board.
The voter privacy is preserved as well. The Farnel box anonymizes the bottom
page cast by the voter and output random chosen bottom pages as receipts. This
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way, the voter cannot use the receipts to indicate her vote even if she receives her
bottom page.
4.4.5 Extensions
The special envelope required in step 3 of the scheme above helps the authorities
to verify the ballot pages were not separated before. This envelope, though, may
not be sufficient to check the separation. As consequence, a malicious voter could
attempt to discredit a voting by marking different options on the two pages.
In order to counter this threat, a physical mechanism to prevent the voter
from separating the pages could be used, such as the folder with key used in
Punchscan [77]. By means of this folder, the authorities lock the ballot inside it
and just unlock it after the voter has marked her vote. Another solution requires
the modification of the ballot form. Instead of using a carbon mechanism to
transfer the marks, the top page would have holes a` la Punchscan and the voter
would use a bingo dauber to select her option. Each role, however, would have a
different pattern. Thus, if the voter marks a pattern on the top page, she could
not mark a different pattern on the bottom page as the patterns would not match
on both pages.
4.5 Single Box Farnel Scheme
The design presented above is awkward in several aspects: it requires two ballots
boxes and the vote casting procedure is rather complicated and vulnerable to
certain threats. The voter should cast the two pages of her ballot in different
ballot boxes. Also, the procedure of verifying the marks on the two pages could
expose the voter’s option if not performed correctly.
We present here an improved version of the scheme presented in the last section.
The scheme requires just a Farnel box and uses a simpler vote casting procedure.
4.5.1 Requisites
The Ballot Form
The ballot form here follows the structure of the form presented in Section 4.3.1,
that is, it has two pages that are initially overlaid and marks performed on one
page are transfered to the other page. The top page, though, contains only the
options in a random order along with bubbles to select them. The bottom page
contains the same bubbles as the top page and an index. Also, it includes one
commitment to the options of the top page and the index. The index indicates
the options’ order and helps the authorities to identify the order in the tallying
process. The commitment and the index are printed at the foot of the page, on
the left and on the middle, respectively. In addition, the bottom page includes the
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corresponding decommitment that is printed close to the index. The commitment
is covered by a scratch surface apart from the index and the decommitment.
The new ballot design can be also described as follows. Let C be a set of options
available, I a set of positive integers, piC the permutation of C, H a secure hash
function used as commitment, i an index that is a unique number in I, and r a
random number from a large (key) space. The top page is composed of piC and of
the bubbles to select the options. The bottom page contains H(piC , r, i), r, i, and
the same bubbles as the top page. Figure 4.4 illustrates the ballot form required
by the scheme.
The list of possible permutations for all ballots as well as the index correspond-
ing to each permutation are published on the bulletin board before the voting.
Figure 4.4: A ballot form in the single box Farnel scheme.
The Ballot Box
Differently from the previous proposals, the scheme employs just a Farnel box as
described in Chapter 3.
4.5.2 The Scheme
Before the Voting
The authorities define the parameters of the Farnel box (i.e. the number of re-
ceipts per voter l and the number of dummy votes Init) and initialize the box
with dummy votes (see Sections 3.5 and 3.4 for details).
For the initialization as well as for the voting phase, an auditing process is
necessary. The audit has the goal of detecting malformed ballot forms and is
performed as follows. The authorities select a set of blank ballots at random,
separate the two pages of each ballot, and detach their scratch surfaces. In order
to verify a ballot, the authorities hash the options on the top page (piC) along
with the random number (r) and with the index (i) printed on the bottom page.
Then they compare the resulting hash with the value (H(piC , r, i)) also on the
bottom page. In addition, they verify the randomization on the top page and the
randomization indicated by the index i match.
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In the voting phase, helper organizations assist the voter to audit blank ballot
forms in the same way. That is, the voter selects some ballots at random and
hands them to the organizations that verify the commitments on the ballots.
After auditing the ballots, the authorities publicly initialize the Farnel box as
follows. First, they mark an option on each (entire) blank ballot. After this,
the authorities separate the two pages of the ballots and destroy the top pages
through a paper shredder. Now they cast all bottom pages into the Farnel box
and publish the number of votes cast per option on the bulletin board.
Voting
The voting authorities hand a blank ballot to the voter in a sealed envelope after
verifying her eligibility. The voter can either use the blank ballot to vote or audit
it as described above.
Assuming that the ballot form verified is well-formed, it is discarded and the
authorities hand a new blank ballot to the voter. In principle, we could allow the
voter to opt to audit a number of ballots before accepting one to use to cast her
vote. If any ballot audit fails, recovery mechanisms have to be used. The voter
performs the following steps to vote (see also Figure 4.5):
1. Selecting the option
In the voting booth, the voter chooses her option on the ballot form and
marks the corresponding bubble (a);
2. Verifying the ballot
She separates the two pages of her ballot (b) and adds the bottom page
into an envelope to make visible only the scratch surfaces. After this, she
destroys in public the top page by using a paper shredder (c) and hands
the envelope containing the bottom page to the officials. They verify the
surfaces are entire;
3. Casting the vote
The voter removes the bottom page from the envelope and casts it publicly
into the Farnel box (d);
4. Obtaining the receipt
After receiving the bottom page, the Farnel box removes the scratch surface
that covers only the commitment value on the left side, shuﬄes its set of
bottom pages (e), and copies l of them. The copies are held by the voter
as her receipt (f).
The envelope used in step 2 allows the officials to verify the scratch surfaces
without observing the marks. In principle, this envelope is not necessary and
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the officials could verify the bottom page directly. This verification would not
expose the voter’s choice as the bottom page contains the marks without their
corresponding candidates. However, because a malicious official could also iden-
tify the marks, an adversary could collude with him to mount a randomization
attack (see Section 4.2.2 for details). That is, the adversary could instruct the
voter to mark her ballot in a determined position and ask the malicious official
later if the voter has followed his instructions.
Note that the scheme may employ a mechanism to prevent voters from destroy-
ing top pages others than theirs. For example, the ballots could be numbered in
a similar way as in the case of preventing chain voting attacks (see Section 4.2.2).
Figure 4.5: The voting steps of the single box Farnel scheme.
Recovering and Tallying the Votes
In order to count the votes, the talliers open the Farnel box, detach the scratch
surfaces on all ballots, and publish the votes on the bulletin board. The talliers,
then, start the process to recover the votes. In this process, they compare the
index on the votes with the index on the bulletin board to identify the permu-
tation of the options; remember that the permutations as well as their indexes
were previously published. From the permutation identified and the mark on the
vote, the authorities determine the option chosen by the voter.
After recovering the votes, the talliers open all commitments using the random
numbers and the indexes. In this step, they hash the random number and the
index along with the permutation identified before, and then compare the result-
ing hash with the hash on the vote. Now, the authorities count the votes in the
same way as the original Farnel does, that is, all votes are counted and the votes
cast during the initialization phase are subtracted from this sum. This last step
is unnecessary if all initializing votes are void votes.
53
Chapter 4. Voter-Verifiable Voting Schemes
Verifying the Votes
Voters can, as usual, visit the bulletin board and confirm that their receipts ap-
pear accurately, and complain otherwise. In particular, they verify the commit-
ments and the marks on their receipts correspond to those on the votes published
on the board. Helper organizations and observers verify the talliers performed
their work correctly.
4.5.3 Evaluation
As the solution presented in Section 4.4, the scheme relies on the ballot form,
on the Farnel box, and on the bulletin board to satisfy the privacy and the
verifiability properties.
The receipt fulfills the requisites described in Section 4.4.1. Each receipt is a
copy of a bottom page and contains only the voter’s choice and the commitment
to the options. Because the receipts do not include the decommitment values,
an adversary cannot extract the candidate selected from the receipts and thus
obtain information about the results before the tallying.
The commitments and the selections on the receipts also prevent an adversary
from replacing votes without being detected. Because the receipt commits the
option as well as the index that points out the permutation, the adversary cannot
make a fake vote using an option, a different permutation of options, or a different
index. In addition, because the receipt contains a mark in the same position of
the corresponding vote, the adversary cannot make a fake vote with a different
mark.
The scheme is public and voter-verifiable. From the bottom page published on
the board, everyone can hash the index, the options that the index points out
along with the key and verify the resulting hash match the value of the page. The
voters, in addition, can match the marks on their receipts with the corresponding
votes on the board and verify the hash on their receipts and on the votes are the
same.
The scheme meets privacy. When casting her vote into the Farnel box, the
only information that the voter learns is the option that she chooses and the
permutation of her ballot; the commitments as well as the decommitment values
are hidden under scratch surfaces. Due to this and the fact that the Farnel box
returns the voter copies of random selected votes, the voter cannot compromise
her privacy.
4.5.4 Extension - Human Readable Paper Audit Trail
(HRPAT)
In the manner of Ryan [84], the scheme could be adapted to provide a HRPAT by
employing a conventional ballot box as alternative to the paper shredder. This
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way, instead of destroying the top page in a paper shredder, this page is cast into
the conventional ballot box. The box would store the top pages as an audit trail
so that the votes can be counted without depending on the votes from the Farnel
box.
4.6 Improving the Threeballot Voting System
The ThreeBallot voting system was proposed by Rivest [80, 82]. The goal of this
system is to satisfy voter-verifiability without relying on cryptography. Several
drawbacks, though, have been reported for Threeballot and improvements were
incorporated in its newer versions. In this section we introduce a variant of
Threeballot that aims mainly at solving the information leakage problem. This
problem was pointed in [5] and independently by Clark et al. [53].
4.6.1 An Overview of the ThreeBallot Voting System
The scheme employs a ballot design that consists of three single ballots. The
ballots are identical except for the random IDs printed on the bottom of them.
That is, they have the same list of options and bubbles to select them, but each
ballot has a unique random ID. The IDs are encoded in a way that the voter
cannot remember them. Figure 4.6 shows an example of the three single ballots.
In Threeballot, the voter should follow some rules to mark her ballot. That is,
in order to vote for an option, the voter should mark the same option in two of
the three ballots. The other options, though, should receive one mark each one
in one of the three ballots. The choice of which of the three ballots she places
these marks should otherwise be random.
After marking her three ballots, the voter inserts them into a machine that
verifies the voter has marked the three ballots according to Threeballot rules. If
the ballots were marked correctly, the voter chooses one of the three ballots as
her receipt and the machine copies the ballot selected. Ideally, this should be
done in a way that prevents the system from learning which of the three ballots
the voter chose to retain as her receipt. Now, the machine casts the three original
ballots into a conventional ballot box to finish the process.
At end of the voting, the ballots cast are published on a bulletin board and
all votes are counted. As each option received one extra vote, these votes are
subtracted from the count to obtain the final results.
Drawbacks
The version of Threeballot presented in [80] has several drawbacks as also dis-
cussed by Rivest. However, most of them were mitigated or even solved in the last
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Figure 4.6: An example of a vote for option A in Threeballot.
version presented in [82]. We briefly describe here two known problems of Three-
ballot: the reconstruction attack and the information leakage problem. Although
Rivest proposed mitigations to the former problem, the latter is still unsolved so
far.
The reconstruction attack As described above, all three single ballots are pub-
lished on the bulletin board after the voting. Strauss [92] showed through sim-
ulations that from the ballots published, it might be possible to reconstruct the
triples and so violate the voters privacy. In order to accomplish the reconstruc-
tion, the adversary chooses a targeted single ballot (possibly the receipt of a
voter) and matches it to every possible pair of ballots on the board. As result,
the attacker might find either the two other ballots that compose uniquely the
valid triple or a set of possible pairs that form valid triples with the targeted
ballot.
In order to mitigate this attack, Rivest proposed to replace receipts by means
of the (original) Farnel idea in [80], that is, instead of keeping her own receipt,
the voter casts it into a Farnel like box and receives another one. In [82], Rivest
et al. consider a short ballot form (i.e. a ballot with few races and few candidates
per race) to increase the possibility ballots being cast with the same pattern.
The information leakage problem The voter’s receipt in Threeballot is a copy
of a single ballot and so it contains part of the marks of the three ballots. Al-
though the receipt cannot be used to associate the voter to her vote, it reveals
a tiny bit of information about the voter’s choice. This information cannot be
used against the voter. However, in a large set of receipts, statistical indication
of the voting results can be exposed before the voting ends.
The flaw is best explained through an extreme example. Suppose a voting with
three candidates where one of them receives all votes and the other two none.
In addition, suppose that all voters behave uniformly at random with regard the
marks and the column they choose as receipt. Finally, assume that all voters
show their receipts to a helper organization.
Counting the number of marks for each candidate (row) on the receipts reveals
information on who is winning the voting at that particular polling place. In this
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example, the winning candidate can expect 2/3 mark per receipt, whereas all the
others can expect only 1/3 mark per receipt. The information is of a statistical
nature.
To show the effect, we wrote a small simulation program. Table 4.1 shows
ten simulations for an election with three candidates (1, 2, and 3), where 100
receipts have been collected and candidate 1 gets all the votes. The lines show
the number of marks for each candidate, leaving no doubt at all about who is
winning already while voting is still going on.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
69 73 61 65 65 64 65 65 68 61
34 39 32 37 29 32 30 31 29 34
43 34 31 37 30 37 37 28 26 27
Table 4.1: A simulation of ten elections where every voter votes for candidate 1
and 100 receipts are collected per election.
In fact we are dealing with two (p, n)-Bernoulli distributions: one with p = 2/3,
and the others with p = 1/3. In both cases n=#receipts.
Observe that adding candidates (rows) to the ballot does not help. Adding
columns does, because it flattens the distributions (p = 1/4 vs. p = 2/4; p = 1/5
vs. p = 2/5 etc.), but this is undesirable for practical reasons. In addition, note
that a statistical analysis is more difficult if the voters do not behave randomly
and the original scheme is used: the voter chooses which column to copy.
This flaw in the ThreeBallot system is debatable. Although the information
obtained from the receipts has the same effect as exit polls, there are two differ-
ences with regard these voting. First, not every country has or allows exit polls.
Second, voters can lie about how they voted, whereas in the threeballot system
the receipts reveal actual information. In an election where the difference of votes
among two candidates is small, for example, the information obtained from the
receipts can certainly influence voters while the election is going on.
In the next section, we present a version of Threeballot that mitigates the
reconstruction attack and the information leakage problem.
4.6.2 The New Proposal
As described before, the votes in the Threeballot system can be reconstructed if
no countermeasure is used and its receipt leaks statistical information about the
voting results. We now introduce a version of Threeballot that overcomes these
problems. Our solution can be seen as a combination of Threeballot scheme with
Preˆt-a`-Voter [83, 22] based ballot forms and with Farnel. It employs cryptography
and does not rely on a machine to check the validity of the voter selections.
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Requisites
An initial ballot design As the proposal of Rivest, the ballot form is composed
of three single ballots. Here, though, the options on the three ballots are permuted
and every ballot has a top and a bottom pages that are initially overlaid. More
specifically, the top page of each single ballot is composed of the same permuted
list of options, bubbles to select the options, and a distinct commitment and its
decommitment to the options; the corresponding bottom page has a copy of the
bubbles and of the commitment printed on top page.
The initial design is also presented as follows. Let C be a list of options, piC the
permutation of C, H a secure hash function used as commitment, and a random
number rj (1 ≤ j ≤ 3). Each single top page is composed of piC , rj, H(piC , rj),
and the bubbles. The bottom page contains only H(piC , rj) and the bubbles.
As before, the commitments and decommitments are covered by scratch surfaces
and a carbon mechanism copies the mark from the top page to the bottom page.
Figure 4.7 shows the new ballot design.
Figure 4.7: On the left the two pages of the first single ballot. On the right
the three single ballots that compose the new ballot design for the Threeballot
scheme.
The ballot boxes In addition to the special ballot design, the scheme employs
two ballot boxes, that is, a Farnel box as described in Chapter 3 and a conven-
tional box.
The Scheme
Before the Voting Following the Farnel idea, our proposal has a setup phase
where the ballot boxes are initialized. Considering the ballot design described
above and the initialization process presented in Section 3.4, the authorities ini-
tialize the conventional box with marked top pages and the Farnel box with the
related marked bottom pages.
Note that, in Threeballot, it is easy to encode void votes (see Section 3.4 for
more information) without needing to introduce an explicit void option: the ballot
form is simply marked with exactly one bubble against each candidate. We still
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need to keep a protected record of how many initial, void votes are cast as this
information is needed for the final check-sums.
As described in Section 3.4, the initialization process includes an audit to detect
malformation of ballots (e.g. ballots with invalid commitments). In order to audit
a ballot here, the scratch surfaces on both pages of the three single ballots are
detached. Then, the commitments on both pages of each ballot are compared and
opened using the decommitment value from the top page. Specially, the options
(piC) printed on the form are hashed along with the random number (rj) and the
result is compared with the commitment (H(piC , rj)) on the top page.
The auditing process is also performed by the voter in the voting phase. That
is, before receiving her blank ballot, the voter assisted by helper organizations
audit some blank ballots as above. Note that, in this case, a mechanism of
recovery should be used if any ballot audit fails.
Voting Upon proving her eligibity to the voting authorities, the voter receives
a sealed envelope with a blank ballot and performs the following steps to cast her
vote:
1. Marking the ballot
As the original Threeballot scheme, the voter marks her option in two of
the three ballots and each other option once in one of the three ballots.
The marks are transferred from the top page to the bottom page;
2. Verifying the scratch surfaces
The voter inserts the three ballots, with their pages still overlaid, into three
envelopes apart. These envelopes have windows to show just the scratch
surfaces and are transparent on the borders. She then hands the envelopes
to the authorities that verify the scratches are intact and the ballots were
not separated before;
3. Verifying the marks on the bottom pages
The voter separates the two pages of each ballot and hands the bottom pages
to the authorities. They verify the pages were correctly marked according
to the Threeballot rules;
4. Casting the vote
The voter casts the three top pages of her ballot apart into the conventional
ballot box;
5. Obtaining a receipt
In order to obtain her receipt, the voter casts the three bottom pages of her
vote into the Farnel box in the presence of the authorities. The Farnel box
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removes the scratch surfaces on the pages, shuﬄes its set of bottom pages,
and returns one or more copies of random bottom pages to the voter.
Note that as the officials verify the marks on the ballot, the protocol does
not prevent randomization attacks (see Section 4.2.2). A malicious official may
observe the marks and reveal them to an adversary afterwards.
Tallying the Votes When the voting has finished, the talliers open in public the
conventional ballot box, detach the scratch strips on all top pages from the box,
and publish the votes on a bulletin board. Additionally, they also publish the
bottom pages from the Farnel box. In order to compute the voting results, the
authorities count all votes on the top pages, and subtract from them the votes
cast before the voting and the extra votes cast a` la Threeballot scheme.
Verifying the Votes From the top pages posted on the board, anyone verifies if
the decommitment values open their respective commitments. As before, this is
performed by hashing the options along with the random number, and then com-
paring the result with the original hash. In addition, the voters can search top
pages on the board that correspond to their receipts (i.e. copies of bottom pages).
Extensions
The scheme could use the original Farnel ballot box (see Chapter 3) adapted to
remove scratch surfaces in replacement of the enhanced Farnel box. In this case,
the box would only exchange receipts as in [80]. That is, instead of casting the
three bottom pages of her ballot (see step 5 above), the voter chooses one of the
three pages, casts it into the adapted box, and destroys the other two pages; the
box gives the voter a random selected receipt from its set. Alternatively, the
voter could cast her three bottom pages and receive three random pages from the
Farnel box. These alternatives have the advantage of employing a more simple
Farnel box while not requiring a check machine.
4.6.3 Achieving Ballot Secrecy without the Farnel Box
The version of the Threeballot scheme proposed above does not leak statistical
information. On the other hand, it actually makes the reconstruction attack
more virulent, but this is countered by the Farnel mechanism. It, however, relies
on Farnel ballot box that adds complexity to the scheme. We discuss now some
ideas to simplify the scheme by making it independent of the Farnel box. Notice
that the ideas are only of theoretical interest.
At first glance, one might think that the new ballot design could be enough
to accomplish a scheme without the Farnel box. Indeed, the new design would
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overcome the information leakage problem. However, it would make the recon-
struction attack easier than in the original Theeballot scheme. Because the ballot
forms have different permutations and each form employs the same permutation
in the three single ballots, the bulletin board can be segmented in groups accord-
ing the permutations used. For a number of voters N and a number of candidates
C, the number of groups is 3n/C! or 3n/C for cyclic permutations. This way,
an attacker only needs to compare ballots in the same group to reconstruct the
votes.
In order to render the reconstruction attack harder to perform, we change our
ballot design to allow distinct permutations in the same ballot. That is, instead
of using the same permutation in the three ballots, a random permutation is
selected for each of the three single ballots. However, now some voters can have
problems to select options in different positions in the three ballots. In addition,
the authorities cannot verify the marks on the three bottom pages as the options
can be in different positions. The first problem could be reduced by training the
voters1, so we concentrate in a solution for the second one.
A possible solution for verifying the marks on a ballot is to introduce a mapping
between the two pages. That is, the options on the top page are mapped to
elements on the bottom page and each option can be associated to different
elements in other ballots (see Figure 4.8 for an example). Thus, the authorities
can verify the bottom page without recognizing the options. This mapping could
be, for example, a bijection between the set of options and a set of positive
integers.
Although the mapping hides the options from the authorities and still makes
possible the check, it would reveal the relationship between the three permu-
tations to the authorities. This way, a malicious authority could perform the
reconstruction attack by grouping the permutations as before.
Figure 4.8: An example of ballot with mapping.
1Note that despite the training, the scheme is not simple and the voters would still have
trouble to fill out their ballots.
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The mapping described makes the scheme simple as the authorities can verify
the marks, but it is insecure. Thus, we rely on a check machine to solve the
problem such as the original Threeballot scheme and avoid the mapping. The
drawback is that here the machine needs to identify the options to verify the
marks.
We assume, however, that the machine can perform comparisons without stor-
ing the options and describe the ballot form as follows: let C be a set of options,
pijC (1 ≤ j ≤ 3) be the permutation of C, H be a secure hash function, and a
random number rj (1 ≤ j ≤ 3) from a large (key) space. Each single top page is
composed of pijC , rj, H(piC , rj) along with the bubbles to mark the options. The
corresponding bottom page contains the same H(pijC , rj) and bubbles of the top
pages. Figure 4.9 illustrates this ballot design.
Based on this modified ballot form and considering the check machine to verify
the votes, the voter now performs the following steps to vote:
1. Selecting the option
She marks her vote on her ballot and verifies the marks by using the check
machine as the Threeballot scheme;
2. Verifying the ballot
The voter inserts her ballot into an envelope that hides the options and
hands it to the authorities. The authorities verify the ballot was not sepa-
rated and check the scratches on the top pages;
3. Casting the vote
She separates her ballot and casts the three single top pages apart into the
conventional ballot box;
4. Obtaining the receipt
In the presence of the authorities, the voter keeps one of the three bottom
pages as receipt and destroys the other two in a paper shredder.
Figure 4.9: A ballot design for three ballots with different permutations.
As we changed just the structure of the ballot by employing different permu-
tations, the tallying of votes remains the same described in Section 4.6.2.
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4.7 Randell-Ryan Scheme with Farnel
Randell and Ryan [78] proposed a simple scheme that intends to improve the
voter secrecy in the existing manual systems and to provide voter-verifiability.
The scheme is based on Preˆt-a`-Voter [83, 22] ballot forms and does not rely on
cryptography. It, however, has a drawback similar to the scheme presented in
Section 4.3. That is, it requires honest authorities to prevent manipulation during
the tally.
In this section we introduce a version of the Randell-Ryan scheme that employs
a Farnel box and a modified ballot form. The new scheme removes the drawback
of the original version.
4.7.1 An Overview of Randell-Ryan Voting Scheme
The scheme employs a ballot form that has a left (LC) and a right (RC) column.
These columns are separated vertically by a perforation. The LC contains a
randomized options list and the RC has the respective spaces to select the options.
A serial number, CIN (code identification number), identifies the ballot uniquely
and is printed at the foot of the LC. The RC has the same CIN at its foot, but
it is covered by a scratch surface; this scratch has a receipt identification number
(RIN) printed over it. The proposal also requires two conventional ballot boxes.
One for receiving left columns and other for receiving right columns.
In order to vote, the voter selects an option on the right column. She then
drops the LC into the ballot box for left columns. After that, in the presence of
officials and observers, a photocopy of the right column, with the scratch strip
intact, is made as the receipt and the voter drops the original RC into the other
ballot box.
In the tabulation process, the officials open the ballot boxes and publish the
RCs on the bulletin board so that the voters can verify their votes. The officials
then scratch off the strip on the RCs to reveal the CIN. After that, they match
the CIN number on the LC and on the RC columns to identify the votes.
Drawback
The scheme has a drawback similar to that of the single scheme presented in
Section 4.3. That is, it requires trustworthy talliers. Otherwise, votes could be
altered before being counted and the voters could not detect this.
According to the scheme, the voter receipt is a copy of the right column with
its RIN. The voter compares the RIN and the mark on her receipt with the right
column published on the bulletin board. However, after the authorities scratch
off the RIN strips to show the CIN, she cannot verify her vote. This way, after
exposing the CIN to count the votes, a malicious authority could potentially alter
votes without being detected.
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Of course, various mechanisms can be proposed to counter this threat, but
the fact remains that the resulting levels of assurance will inevitably be lower
than those achievable using cryptographic mixing/tabulating mechanisms. Thus,
stronger trust assumptions in the Randell-Ryan than in Preˆt-a`-Voter are neces-
sary.
4.7.2 An Improved Scheme
We present now an improved scheme that overcomes the drawback of the Randell-
Ryan proposal.
Requisites
The ballot design The ballot form here is similar to that one employed in the
original scheme. That is, it is composed of a left and a right column that are
separated vertically by perforations. However, now the left column contains a
commitment to the options and its decommitment. The right column contains
spaces to select the options as well as a copy of the commitment. Scratch surfaces
cover the commitments on both sides and the decommitment values.
This ballot design is additionally presented as follows. Let C be a set of options,
piC the permutation of C, H a secure hash function, and r a random number from
a large (key) space. piC , H(piC , r) and r compose the left column. H(piC , r) and
spaces to select the options compose the right column. Figure 4.10 illustrates
this ballot form.
Figure 4.10: The new ballot form based on Randell-Ryan proposal.
Ballot boxes As in the Randell-Ryan scheme, we employ two ballot boxes.
However, one of them is a Farnel ballot box (see Chapter 3 for details). The
other is a conventional box.
The Scheme
Before the Voting Due to the Farnel ballot box, the scheme has a pre-voting
phase where the Farnel box as well as the conventional box are initialized. This
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process is similar to that described in Section 3.4. Here, though, the conven-
tional ballot box is initialized with left columns and the Farnel box receives the
corresponding marked right columns.
In order to audit blank ballots, the scratch surfaces on both sides of the ballot
are detached. By doing this, the commitments (H(piC , r)) on both sides can
be compared. After this comparison, the commitment on the left column is
decommited using the random number printed on the bottom of this page. This
is performed by hashing the options on the left column along with the random
number. The resulting hash is compared with the values on the pages.
Voting After being authenticated by the officials, the voter receives her blank
ballot in a sealed envelope. She can either audit her ballot or use it to vote. In the
former case, she performs the auditing steps described above with the support of
helper organizations and receives a new blank ballot from the officials after this.
If any ballot audit fails, recovery mechanisms are necessary. The voter performs
the following steps to vote:
1. Marking the ballot
In the voting booth, the voter looks her option on the left column and marks
the corresponding space on the right column as in Randell-Ryan scheme;
2. Checking the ballot
She separates the left and right columns of her ballot form and inserts them
into two envelopes apart. The envelopes have a window on the foot that
shows only the scratch surfaces. The voter hands these envelopes to the
officials that verify the surfaces are intact;
3. Casting the vote
In the presence of the officials and observers, the voter casts the envelope
containing the left column into the conventional box;
4. Obtaining the receipt
She now removes the right column from the envelope and casts it into the
Farnel box. The box then removes the scratch surface on the column and
returns her copies of random chosen columns as receipt.
Tallying the Votes After the voting, the talliers open in public the two ballot
boxes, and detach the scratch surfaces on all left columns (LC). Then, they
open all commitments on the left columns to verify the votes. As before, this is
performed by hashing the options and the random number, and then comparing
the result with the hash on the pages. After that, the authorities use the hash
values to match the right and left sides. This allows the marks on the RC columns
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to be interpreted and counted. Then, the results are computed as in the Farnel
scheme. That is, all votes are counted and initial votes are subtracted from the
count.
Notice that the scheme can be implemented using a ballot style without the
hashes. However, in this case it may be possible for the tabulating authorities
to manipulate the candidate lists unless appropriate anti-counterfeiting measures
are in place. A nice feature of dropping the hashes is that we do not have to worry
about checking the correctness of the hashes: a ballot is well formed as long as
the CIN #s match. Thus, if we have on-demand printing of the candidates lists
we simply need to ensure that the ordering is randomized.
If the threat of manipulation of the candidate’s order during tabulation is
regarded as sufficiently serious, then the hash function would be used. Here,
though, we do need to check that the ballots are well-formed w.r.t. the hashes.
Verifying the Votes Anyone can visit the bulletin board and verify each left
column has a corresponding right column with the same hash value. Moreover,
anyone can make the hashes again from the options on the left columns and the
key values to verify the hashes are correct. The voters match their receipts to
the right columns on the board to verify the corresponding votes.
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4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have first presented a new voter-verifiable voting scheme. This
solution does not employ cryptography, but it requires trustworthy talliers to
achieve security. We then have introduced a scheme that requires a commitment
scheme and uses a Preˆt-a`-Voter style ballot form. This scheme provides better
security guarantees as the first one. Our third solution simplifies the second one.
It employs just a Farnel box instead of two boxes as the previous solutions.
In addition to these solutions, we have proposed improvements to the Three-
ballot scheme. In particular, we have combined the Threeballot along with Preˆt-
a`-Voter style forms and the Farnel box. A version of Threeballot that does not
require the Farnel box was given, but it requires a special verification machine.
We have also presented a version of Randell-Ryan scheme that uses the Farnel
box and provides better security assurances.
Our solutions consider that corruption of votes take place only after the voting.
Because the voting process is usually supervised by third parties and part of the
authorities are supposed to be honest, malicious behaviors can be identified and
prevented. If we consider that the voting process is not supervised and that all
authorities are dishonest, these officials could open the Farnel box and corrupt
votes. The corruption may not be detected if performed during the voting and
most of the votes do not have corresponding receipts. However, if all officials
are dishonest, they may also collude with vote-buyers and let them observe their
victims while they are voting. Moreover, they may even allow chain voting by
ignoring the verification process (see Section 4.2.2). This would undermine the
security of other voting systems as well. Therefore, at least a small number of
honest authorities is necessary during the voting.
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Chapter 5
A Coercion-Resistant Scheme for
Internet Elections
This chapter contains work published in Frontiers of Electronic Voting [6] and
will appear on Towards Trustworthy Election Systems book [21]. This is joint
work with Se´bastien Foulle and Jacques Traore´.
5.1 Introduction
Coercion and vote-selling are known threats inherent in remote voting systems.
Until recently, these problems were not treated accordingly in the literature.
Proposals as [8, 48, 65] prevent voters from proving by means of receipts how
they have voted, but cannot avoid other threats as voters handing their private
data (e.g. secret keys) to coercers or vote-buyers. Since the introduction of the
concept of coercion-resistance, remote voting became more realistic. This concept
was proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [60] (JCJ) and is the strongest
known property for such scenarios. It considers not only that the voter may
be coerced to prove her vote, but also that she could be forced to abstain from
voting, to reveal her private data, or to cast random votes.
Along with the coercion-resistance concept, JCJ also introduced the first scheme
to satisfy it. The scheme employs anonymous credentials and basically mitigates
coercive attacks by allowing the voter to deceive adversaries about her true vote
intention. Despite being the best solution for remote voting when compared with
previous protocols, the scheme is impractical for voting with a large number of
voters as it requires a quadratic work factor (in number of votes) to compute
the voting results. This drawback is directly related to the fact that the scheme
employs an inefficient blind comparison mechanism.
With the goal of overcoming the drawback of JCJ solution, we introduce in
this chapter a novel coercion-resistant voting scheme based on JCJ ideas. The
new proposal employs anonymous credentials and fight coercive attacks as the
previous solution. It, however, employs special credentials and does not rely on
blind comparisons. The new protocol has linear work factor and hence is efficient
for large scale voting.
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This chapter is organized as follows: the next section introduces the coercion-
resistant property as well as the security model that the new scheme uses; Sec-
tion 5.3 recalls briefly the proposal of JCJ; Section 5.4 presents the new coercion-
resistant scheme; after that, an analysis of the scheme is showed in Section 5.5;
finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 5.6.
5.1.1 Related Work
The proposal of Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson first appeared in 2002 at Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive [59]. After improvements, it was effectively published in
2005 at WPES [60].
Following JCJ’s work, a number of other schemes were proposed. Acquisti [1]
introduced a scheme in which the vote and the credential are combined, and which
relies strongly on homomorphisms. Clarkson et al. [25] presented a variant of
Preˆt-a`-Voter scheme suitable for Internet voting and based on decryption mixnets.
Schweisgut [89] and more recently Clarkson et al. [23, 24] proposed schemes which
mitigate the inefficiency problem of the JCJ solution. The former scheme relies
on decryption mixnets and on tamper-resistant hardware, whereas the latter is a
modified version of the JCJ proposal.
The most promissing scheme based on JCJ ideas was introduced by Smith
[91]. He presented an efficient scheme with linear work factor. Weber et al. [95],
however, pointed out problems of Smith’s proposal and presented a protocol that
combines the ideas of JCJ with a variant of Smith’s mechanism. The solutions
of Smith and Weber et al. are not coercion-resistant as showed in [6]. This was
also noted independently by Clarkson et al. [23, 24].
The scheme that we introduced in this chapter is related to all these works since
it is also based on JCJ’s ideas and aims at satisfying the coercion-resistant prop-
erty. We do not consider here other proposals that fulfill less strong properties
as receipt-freeness.
5.2 Preliminaries
We recall next the coercion-resistant property of JCJ and present the attack
model that our scheme requires. This model was used by JCJ in their coercion-
resistant scheme.
5.2.1 The Coercion-Resistant Security Property
Until recently voting schemes had the goal of satisfying the receipt-freeness secu-
rity property, such as the proposals of Baudron et al. [8] and Hirt-Sako [48]. That
is, the notion of preventing the voter to make or obtain information to prove how
she has voted.
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Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [60], however, observed that the receipt-freeness
property is not sufficient to prevent real-world attacks and introduced the con-
cept of coercion-resistance. This concept considers not only the receipts-freeness
but also the following attacks: randomization, forced-abstention, and simulation.
In the randomization attack [88], as described in Section 4.2.2, the adversary
forces the voter to cast (publish) a randomly formed vote. The voter or the
adversary may not know the candidate selected; the objective is to nullify the
voter’s intention with high probability.
An adversary may also force the voter to abstain from voting, that is the
forced-abstention attack. In this case, the adversary uses any public information
posted by the voter and necessary for her authentication to mount the attack.
For example, if the voter is required to post a digital signature along with her
vote on the bulletin board, the attacker can force the voter to not to vote and
verify she followed his instructions.
In the simulation attack, an adversary forces the voter to reveal any private
information that she may use to vote and vote on her behalf. For example, if the
voter has a pair of keys and need to use her private key to vote, the coercer can
force the voter to hand him this key.
A formal definition of the coercion-resistance property can be found in Juels,
Catalano, and Jakobsson [60] and in Delaune et al. [32].
5.2.2 Attack Model
The coercion-resistance property takes into account typical problems of remote
voting. The scheme we introduce below aims at satisfying this property. In order
to fulfill it, however, our proposal depends on certain assumptions and conditions
described here. Similarly to JCJ scheme, we consider the following:
• An adversary may impede the voter to vote, force the voter to post a random
composed ballot material, or demand secret information from the voter.
The adversary has limited computational power and is able to compromise
only a small number of authorities;
• An adversary may monitor the voter or interact with her during the voting
process. However, we suppose the adversary is not able to monitor or
interact with the voter continuously during the voting period;
• A registration phase free of adversaries. That is, the registration official is
trustworthy and voters receive private data securely. Also, we assume that
the voters communicate with the registrar via a untappable channel and
without the interference of adversaries. This channel provides information-
theoretical secrecy to the communication;
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• Some anonymous channels in the voting phase. These channels are used by
the voters to post their votes and prevent adversaries from learning who
sent a specific vote. In practice, voters may use public computers to achieve
this;
• Voters cast their votes by means of reliable machines. We do not consider
attacks where the adversary may control the voters’ computers (e.g. by
means of malwares) in order to obtain their votes or other private data.
Solutions as the code voting method proposed by Joaquim et al. [54] could
help to prevent these threats;
• Denial of service attacks are not considered. The scheme employs bulletin
boards that receive data from anyone and hence would be susceptible to
these attacks. However, challenge-response techniques like CAPTCHAS [94]
or cryptographic puzzles [58] could be used to mitigate these problems.
5.3 An Overview of JCJ Scheme
The scheme of Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [60] relies essentially on a method
of indirect identification through anonymous credentials to overcome coercive
attacks. Especially, the voter receives a valid credential (e.g. an alphanumeric
string) in a secure way and uses it when she want to cast her valid vote. A
voter under coercion, though, is able to make a fake credential and to hand
it to a coercer. When in safety, the voter can vote using her valid credential.
After the end of the voting, a blind comparison mechanism distinguishes the
valid credentials from the fake ones to identify the valid votes; conversely, an
adversary has no way to perform this distinction.
The scheme considers a registration phase free of adversaries and a bulletin
board communication model. Also, it requires the following cryptographic tools:
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, a probabilistic threshold public-key cryp-
tosystem, and universally verifiable mixnets. In particular, the scheme employs
a plaintext equivalence test (see Section 2.5.5 for details). Loosely speaking, this
primitive takes two ciphertexts as input and returns a bit indicating if the cor-
responding plaintexts are equal or not. The JCJ solution is briefly described as
follows:
Registration phase
In this phase a trustworthy authority issues a unique valid credential, which is a
random value, for each eligible voter and publishes a probabilistic encryption of
each credential on the bulletin board. Let L1 be the list containing all credential
ciphertexts published by the authority on the bulletin board.
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Voting phase
In order to vote, a voter sends the following data to the bulletin board through
an anonymous channel: a tuple containing her encrypted vote, her encrypted
credential, and zero-knowledge proofs that the vote is for a valid candidate and
that the voter knows the vote and the credential encrypted.
Tallying phase
At the end of the voting, the talliers verify all proofs posted on the board and
exclude tuples with invalid proofs. From the remaining tuples, they perform a
pairwise blind comparison by means of the plaintext equivalence test to remove
tuples with duplicated credentials. After removing the duplicates keeping the
last posted tuples, the remaining pairs of ciphertexts (a vote and a credential)
form the list L2 and this list is sent to a mixnet. The mixnet returns L2′. Then,
the list L1 created during the registration phase is sent to a different mixnet that
returns L1′. Now, the plaintext equivalence test is used a second time to com-
pare (pairwise) the credentials on the list L1′ with the credentials on the list L2′.
A vote is removed if its encrypted credential in L2′ does not match with an ele-
ment of L1′. Finally, the votes with valid credentials are decrypted by the talliers.
Drawback
Although the JCJ scheme fulfills the coercion-resistance property, the pairwise
blind comparisons involving the plaintext equivalence tests makes it inefficient
for large scale elections. Let N be the number of voters and V be the number of
posted votes, one has V ≥ N and the overhead to perform the tests is quadratic
in V .
5.4 The New Scheme
The voting scheme introduced in this chapter inherits the concept presented by
JCJ in their scheme. That is, voters employ anonymous credentials to cast their
votes and are not directly identified in the voting process. Moreover, voters may
vote multiple times and deceive adversaries by means of fake credentials. Our
proposal, though, differs from the previous solution basically in two ways: it relies
on special formed credentials and does not require blind comparisons against a
list of encrypted credentials.
Our proposal is summarized as follows: in a registration phase, trustworthy
registrars issue securely to each eligible voter a valid credential that is composed
of four parts. This is performed without storing the credential in an encrypted
form for later comparison as in the JCJ scheme. At time of voting, the voter
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performs computations and publishes ciphertexts corresponding to the parts of
her credential as well as to her vote and a set of zero-knowledge proofs on the
bulletin board. In the tallying phase, votes with invalid proofs and all votes
posted with the same credential but the last posted are excluded. After mixing
the remaining encrypted votes along with their credentials, the talliers assisted
by the registrars apply a function to parts of each credential to identify the valid
votes. Finally, the votes with valid credentials are decrypted.
We introduce next the details regarding the new coercion-resistant scheme.
5.4.1 Credentials
In the proposal of JCJ, a valid credential is a random string. The scheme proposed
here, differently, employs credentials that has a mathematical structure based on
the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17].
A valid credential in our scheme has the following form: let G be a cyclic
group with prime order p where the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is
hard, (x, y) two secret keys, a a random number in G (with a 6= 1), r a random
number in Zp, the credential is composed of (r, a, b = a
y, c = ax+rxy).
The security of our credentials relies heavily on the LRSW (Lysyanskaya,
Rivest, Sahai, and Wolf) and on the DDH assumptions (see Section 2.2 for de-
tails). The former assumption ensures that even if an adversary has many genuine
credentials (ri, ai, bi, ci), it is hard for him to forge a new and valid credential
(r, a, b, c), with r 6= ri for all i. This assumption is known to hold for generic
groups and the security of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya’s signature scheme also
relies on it. The DDH assumption ensures that the voter cannot prove to anyone
else whether (r, a, b, c) is a valid credential or not. This way, a voter under coer-
cion can make a fake r to deceive an adversary who will not be able to distinguish
between a fake and a valid r.
In a real-world scenario, our credential can be seen as containing two parts: a
short one, that is r, which must be kept secret, and a long one, that is (a, b, c).
The first part (i.e. r) has around twenty ASCII characters (this corresponds to
160 bits, the actual secure size for the order of generic groups), so a small piece of
paper and a pen are sufficient to write r down. The other part can be stored in a
device or be even sent by email to the voter without compromising the credential
security.
5.4.2 Participants and Notation
The scheme involves three participants.
Voter The voter is denoted by V . She holds a valid credential and uses it when
she wants to cast her valid vote. Also, she is able to make fake credentials
and use them to deceive adversaries;
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Talliers These authorities are represented by T . They are responsible for con-
trolling the bulletin board, for running the mixnet, and for computing the
voting results. They share an M-El Gamal private key T̂ corresponding to
a public key T ;
Registrars They are denoted by R. These authorities are responsible for issuing a
valid credential for each eligible voter. Also, they help the talliers to identify
valid credentials. They share two private keys, x and y corresponding to
the public keys Rx and Ry.
We employ the following notation in the description below: BB is a bulletin
board, ET [m] is an M-El Gamal encryption of a message m constructed with T ,
and DTˆ [m] is an M-El Gamal decryption of m with T̂ . See Section 2.3.1 for a
description of this version of the El Gamal cryptosystem.
5.4.3 Scheme in Details
Setup phase
In this phase the general voting parameters are established and published along
with a digital signature on BB. These parameters consist of a cyclic group G
with prime order p where the decision Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, a random
generator o of G as well as the keys of T . Especially, the talliers T cooperate
to generate the public key T and the shared private key T̂ via the M-El Gamal
threshold cryptosystem (see Section 2.3.1).
The registrars R collaborate to produce their public keys Rx and Ry and their
respective shared private keys x and y. These public keys are computed as
follows: Rx = g
x and Ry = g
y, where g is a public random generator of G. This
is accomplished through the key generation protocol described in Section 2.3.1.
Also, the list of voting candidates available is published.
Registration phase
After verifying that a voter is eligible, R issues to the voter a secret credential
σ = (r, a, b, c) via an untappable channel, where a is a random element in G (with
a 6= 1), r is a random element in Zp, b = ay, and c = ax+rxy. In addition, R
may furnish the voter with a designated verifier proof [51] of well-formedness for
σ. By means of this proof, the voter can check the validity of his credential, but
cannot convince others about this.
Note that if (r, a, b, c) is valid, then for all r the credential (r, al, bl, cl) for
l ∈R Zp is a valid one too. This property is used by the voter to change the
values a, b, and c each time she votes.
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Voting phase
The voter casts her ballot by sending the following tuple through an anonymous
channel to BB :
〈ET [C], a, ET [ar], ET [ary], ET [ax+rxy], or, P 〉
C is the candidate chosen, (r, a, ar, ary, ax+rxy) correspond to voter’s credential,
o is the public generator of G published in the setup phase, and P is a list of non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs which ensures that the vote is well-formed. In
particular, P contains a proof that the vote is for a valid candidate as presented
in Section 2.5.6, proofs of knowledge of the plaintexts according to Section 2.5.1,
and a proof that ET [a
r] and or contain the same r as described in Section 2.5.4.
Recall from the previous paragraph that the values a, b = ay, and c = ax+rxy
have been changed by the voter and are therefore different from the ones she
received from R.
The value or is used to detect duplicates and guarantees that only one vote
per voter will be counted. Otherwise, a dishonest voter could vote several times
without being detected.
Tallying phase
In order to compute the voting results, the talliers T perform the following steps:
1. Verifying proofs
T verifies the proofs P on each tuple and removes tuples with invalid proofs.
That is, T verifies that a is in G and a 6= 1, that ET [C] is a vote for a valid
candidate, the proofs of knowledge of the plaintexts, and the proof that
ET [a
r] and or contain the same r;
2. Removing duplicates
In order to exclude duplicates, T first identifies them by comparing all or,
for instance, using a hashtable [27]. After this, T keeps the last posted
tuples based on the order of posting on the bulletin board;
3. Encrypting the plaintext element
The tuples that passed the previous steps have their values or and P deleted,
and their second component (i.e. a) replaced by the M-El Gamal ciphertext
ET [a]. This way, only the values ET [C], ET [a], ET [a
r], ET [a
ry], ET [a
x+rxy]
are processed in the next step;
4. Mixing tuples
T sends the tuples composed of ET [C], ET [a], ET [a
r], ET [a
ry], ET [a
x+rxy] to
a universally verifiable mixnet and publish the output on BB. Let the tuples
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formed by (t, u, v, w, z) = (ET [C]
′, ET [a]′, ET [ar]′, ET [ary]′, ET [ax+rxy]′) be
the mixnet output, where ET [X]
′ means a reencryption of ET [X];
5. Identifying valid votes
a) For each tuple, R first employs its secret key y to cooperatively com-
pute vy;
b) By means of the plaintext equivalence test from Section 2.5.5, R checks
whether vy and w have the same plaintext;
c) If the verification result is positive, R generates a fresh shared key α ∈R
Zp and cooperatively computes (zu
−xw−x)α using the shared private
key x that was generated along with y in the setup phase. The new
key is generated using the key generation protocol from Section 2.3.1;
d) The officials T collaborate to decrypt the resulting ciphertext pro-
cessed by R through the decryption protocol presented in Section 2.3.1.
The decryption is equal to 1 if and only if the credential is a valid one.
Note that if the credential is invalid, just computing and decrypting
(zu−xw−x) may give some information to an adversary, so the random
exponent α is necessary;
6. Decrypting and counting the votes
T employs its shared private key T̂ to cooperatively decrypt ET [C] of each
tuple with a valid credential. After that, they count the votes and publish
the results on BB.
Notice that a voter under coercion should reveal the correct values a and b
of her credential. Otherwise, an adversary can test whether this pair is correct
by mounting a ”1009 attack” [91]. That is, the adversary sends ”1009” ballots
containing pairs of the form (ali, bli) using 1009 random values li and checks
whether more than 1009 ballots passed the first test in step 5 of the tallying
phase.
5.4.4 Multiple Elections
The number of eligible voters may change in different elections. Some voters
may have their right to vote revoked after having participated in an election, for
instance. Also, a voter may be allowed to vote in several elections, but may not
in others. In order to satisfy these scenarios, a credential is normally required
to be used in multiple elections and should be revoked by the authorities when
necessary.
The credential we proposed may be used in multiple elections as long as the
same keys (x, y) are employed. However, in principle a credential cannot be
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revoked. As only the voters know their credentials, the authorities are not able
to revoke a credential. In addition, even if the authorities store all credentials
issued, they are not able to efficiently identify a revoked credential since the
credentials are published in an encrypted form.
Although the design of our scheme makes revocation difficult, the scheme has
some properties that help accomplishing this. Upon registering, a voter receives
(r, a, b = ay, and c = ax+rxy). As stated before, the element r must be transmitted
via an untappable channel. However, the elements (a, b = ay, and c = ax+rxy)
may be sent by post or even by email; this does not compromise the credential
security as long as the DDH assumption holds. Based on this, we suggest the
following method to revoke credentials and to perform new elections:
Besides generating and issuing a credential for each voter, the registrars R
cooperatively compute the encryption of (ar) and (a) (i.e. ER[a], ER[a
r]) and
stores them in a list. These encryptions are performed using a public key R
corresponding to a shared private key R̂ especially generated for this purpose.
For each new election, instead of using the same keys (x, y), the registrars
generate new keys (x′, y′) and furnish the voters with new values (a′ = al, b′ =
a′y
′
, and c′ = a′x
′+rx′y′), computed from ER[a] and ER[a
r], for a randomly chosen l.
That is, c′ is computed by raising ER[a] and ER[ar] to x′ and to x′y′ respectively,
and then by using homomorphism to obtain ER[a
x′+rx′y′ ]. After that, ER[a
x′+rx′y′ ]
is raised to l and cooperatively decrypted. The values a′ and b′ can be obtained
similarly, but without using homomorphism. The new elements of the credential
could be sent by mail to the voter or published on a dedicated website.
5.5 Evaluation
The scheme presented in the previous section aims at fulfilling the coercion-
resistant requirement as well as standard voting security requirements. We eval-
uate now our scheme based on these requirements and consider the attack model
introduced in Section 5.2.2.
Coercion Resistance
In order to be coercion resistant, a voting scheme must be receipt-free and de-
feat coercive attacks, such as randomization, forced-abstention, and simulation
attacks, as defined by JCJ.
A scheme is receipt-free if the voter is not able to make or obtain a receipt to
prove in which way she has voted. Especially, the voter here may not convince
an adversary that her credential is valid and that she used it to cast a particular
vote. Our proposal satisfies these requisites. The voter is not able to prove an
adversary that her credential is valid and an adversary cannot determine whether
a credential is valid or not unless he can break the DDH problem. In addition,
78
5.5 Evaluation
the credentials are verified only after a mixing process and the method employed
to verify them (see step 5 in the tallying phase) does not leak any information.
This way, the voter is not able to obtain any evidence that can be used as a proof.
The proposal we presented is resistant to the randomization attack as well. In
this attack an adversary forces the voter to cast a ballot composed of random
information. As the voter in our scheme publishes her vote along with a set
of zero-knowledge proofs and all votes with invalid proofs are excluded, ballots
randomly composed will not be tallied. In addition, even if the adversary observes
the voter and forces her to vote for a random candidate, she cannot verify the
voter performed this using her valid credential.
In the forced-abstention attack an adversary forces the voter to abstain from
voting. This attack is possible if the adversary can verify the voter has voted.
Our scheme, however, does not reveal any information about the voter identity.
The voter receives a valid credential that identifies her, but it is kept hidden
from adversaries. That is, the voter publishes the credential ciphertext on the
bulletin board via an anonymous channel and the credential is verified in the
tallying phase (step 5) without being decrypted. Hence, the adversary cannot
check whether the voter has voted or not.
The fact that the voter’s identity is concealed also prevent an adversary from
forcing a voter to show the random exponents used for encrypting her ballot
components. As the voter posts her ballot through an anonymous channel and
no information about the credential is revealed during the tallying, the adversary
does not know who voted. This way, a coerced voter can say an adversary that
she did not vote and he cannot verify whether the voter told him the truth or
not. An adversary could also force the voter to reveal the exponents before she
sends her ciphertexts. However, the voter can use a fake credential and show the
exponents of the corresponding components.
Our scheme also prevents the simulation attack. In this attack an adversary
forces the voter to reveal her valid credential and vote on his behalf. However,
the voter in our solution is able to deceive the adversary by handing him a fake
credential and the adversary cannot distinguish a valid credential from a fake
one under the DDH assumption. The credential structure, the mix process as
well as the method used to identify valid credentials prevent the adversary from
performing the distinction.
Democracy and Accuracy
In our proposal, the bulletin board may accept votes from eligible and non-eligible
voters and the voters may vote multiple times. However, only votes from eligible
voters appear in the final tally and only one vote per eligible voter is counted. The
scheme accomplishes this by excluding votes posted with the same credential (see
step 3 in tallying phase). This way, even if a voter uses the same credential to vote
many times, only the last vote will be processed. In addition, the scheme checks
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whether the credentials are valid or not and excludes votes with fake credentials.
This is performed by the method that identifies valid credentials in step 5 of the
tallying phase. Since the method only outputs the value 1 for valid credentials
and that it is hard to forge valid credentials under the LRSW assumption, it
ensures that only votes from eligible voters will be in the final tally. Conversely,
the method outputs a random number as result for invalid credentials. This way,
votes from non-eligible voters (i.e. invalid votes) will not be counted.
Universal Verifiability
Anyone is able to verify the correctness of the voting process and its results in
our solution. This requirement is ensured by the public bulletin board, which is
secure, and by the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKPs). The proofs
generated in all phases of the scheme are published on the bulletin board to allow
anyone to verify them. In addition, the voters publish their votes on bulletin
board, so anyone is able to verify the votes that will be processed. In the tallying
phase, the steps performed can also be verified by anyone through the bulletin
board; this includes the shuﬄe performed by the mixnet and our method to
identify valid credentials.
The bulletin board and the NIZKPs also prevent the disassociation of the pair
of ciphertexts (a vote and a credential). After the voter publishes her ballot on
the board, any transformation of the ciphertexts (i.e. reencryptions) is proved
through the NIZKPs.
Efficiency
As described before, the JCJ scheme requires a quadratic running time. The
reason for this is the pairwise blind comparison mechanism used for removing
duplicates and for identifying valid credentials. Our proposal, differently, does
not rely on blind comparisons. The duplicates are identified in the scheme by
comparisons that can be performed in a linear time, for instance by means of
a hash table. Similarly, the scheme identifies valid credentials by testing each
credential apart and this can be also performed efficiently. Thus, let N be the
number of eligible voters and V the number of posted votes, our scheme has a
running time O(N+V ). As V may be much greater than N , our scheme is linear
in the number of votes.
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5.6 Conclusions
We have introduced a practical scheme for remote Internet voting that satisfies the
coercion-resistant property. This property takes into account realistic threats for
remote voting scenarios. Our solution is inspired by the ideas of Juels, Catalano,
and Jakobsson. It relies on anonymous credentials that protect voters against
adversaries.
The new scheme employs credentials based on Camenisch and Lysyankaya
group signature protocol. The new credentials allow the scheme to avoid compa-
risons of ciphertexts and consequently to achieve linear work factor. Credentials
based on Boneh et al. [12] group signatures can be used in a similar way.
In principle, the credentials of our proposal cannot be revoked and novel cre-
dentials would be necessary for a new voting. However, we have presented a
protocol that renders possible the revocation of credentials so that credentials
can be used in multiple elections. This protocol relies on the fact that part of the
credentials can be made public without compromising the security of the scheme.
We have also evaluated the new scheme based on standard security require-
ments for electronic voting as well as the coercion-resistant property.
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Future Work
This work presented voting protocols for polling station and remote Internet
voting. The former schemes are voter-verifiable and employ a new concept of
ballot box. The remote Internet voting protocol satisfies the coercion-resistance
property and is practical for large scale voting.
The new ballot box concept anonymizes elements and outputs copies of random
elements as receipts after receiving a new element. It is based on the original Far-
nel box. We have specified the box and its requisites. In addition, we performed
simulations to verify the privacy of the first voter. Although in the simulations
the voter privacy is maintained for small number of initial votes, the exact value
of this parameter is not clear.
Implementing the concept of the Farnel box in a way that requires minimal
trust in the mechanism or procedures is challenging. We have proposed a number
of possible implementations, but other implementations could be investigated in
order to reduce the trust in the components. Rivest employed the original Farnel
idea to overcome the reconstruction attack in the version of the Threeballot
proposed in [80]. In his scheme, a copy of a vote is made in advance and then
it is exchanged by means of Farnel. A similar idea could be explored to avoid
making copies inside the box as we presented. That is, a number of copies of the
vote or receipt (without the scratch surface) could be made in advance and then
cast into an original Farnel box. Additional mechanisms to prevent the exposure
of the commitment values would be necessary, though.
The first voter-verifiable scheme presented can be easily understandable by the
voters since it does not employ cryptography. However, as malicious behaviors
during the tally may compromise the voting integrity, this scheme requires honest
talliers. In order to reduce the trust in the talliers, we have given a new version
of this scheme. The proposal employs a Preˆt-a`-Voter style ballot and a single
cryptographic primitive. These solutions require a conventional ballot box in
addition to the new Farnel concept. We have also proposed a scheme that requires
just a Farnel box and has a single ballot casting procedure.
Besides these schemes, we have showed variants of the Threeballot and Randell-
Ryan schemes. The new version Threeballot scheme does not leak indication of
the voting results as the original one. It uses a Preˆt-a`-Voter style ballot and a
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Farnel box. Although it employs cryptography to overcome this drawback, it
does not require a verification machine to check ballots; this can be performed by
the officials. We have proposed a Threeballot version that does not require the
Farnel box, but it requires a more complex verification machine. This scheme,
though, could be improved to avoid this machine.
The Randell-Ryan scheme variant does not require honest talliers or other
techniques to prevent corruption of votes. It employs a modified ballot form and
replaces one of the conventional boxes by a Farnel box. Even though the new
scheme is more complex than the original version due to its new components, it
ensures more security guarantees than the previous one.
The voter-verifiable schemes proposed are paper-based and employ a physical
Farnel box. Most of the ideas of the box, though, could be used in an electronic
scheme. For instance, a direct electronic machine could generate the initial votes
and commit to them. After receiving a new vote, it could decommit some random
votes as receipt to the voter.
The new scheme for remote voting fulfills the same properties and overcomes
coercive attacks as the proposal of Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson. Also, it has
a linear work factor. The scheme employs special credentials of which security
relies on two known assumptions. In addition, it does not require comparisons
against a list of ciphertexts.
We have presented a solution in which the credentials are generated directly by
the officials. The protocol can be improved to issue credentials in a distributed
setting. Moreover, it considers reliable client machines. As clients could be
compromised by malicious softwares in practice, the scheme can be modified to
overcome these threats.
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